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ABSTRACT

MANAGING INFORMATION SECURITY
INVESTMENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: OPTIMAL
POLICIES FOR TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT AND
INFORMATION SHARING
FEBRUARY 2019
YUERAN ZHUO
B.Sc., NANKAI UNIVERSITY
M.Eng., NANKAI UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Senay Solak

Information systems are an integral part of today’s business environment. Businesses, government organizations, and the society rely on these systems for various
transactions, most of which have huge financial implications. Hence, attacks that
breach information systems result in interruption of operations, loss of data and customer confidence, constituting a significant threat to firms.
Such attacks have been increasing in frequency and sophistication over time, and
defending the assets of a firm in response to these attacks has become a key operational
issue. According to Ponemon (2016a), information security attacks cost a typical large
firm $7.7 million per year on average, while Ponemon (2016b) reports that the average
annual total cost of attacks on information systems has increased by 30% between
year 2013 and 2016. In several cases, the cost of an information security attack can
vi

reach very high levels, as evidenced through some recent major breaches released to
the public, such as the Target breach in December 2013 with an estimated cost of $1
billion and the Home Depot breach in September 2014 with an estimated cost of $142
million (Vomhof, 2013). Based on an estimate by Lewis (2018), the global cost of
crime that exploits information systems has exceeded half a trillion dollars per year.
The losses due to attacks on information systems can be mitigated through investments in information security technologies and services. Guttman and Roback
(1995) and Hoo (2000) define information systems security as an integral element in
the management of a firm, and highlight its importance as a key area for the successful operation of a business. Hence, most firms utilize separate information security
budgets, dedicated for investment towards preserving the assets of the firm against
attacks. While the type of business plays a role in determining the ratio of the information security budget with respect to a firm’s overall information technology budget,
it is well known that this ratio has been steadily increasing over the recent years, along
with the actual dollar value allocated to information security (Peters, 2009, Richardson, 2010). Kessel and Allan (2013) note that 46% of the responding organizations in
a survey reported increases in their information security budgets every year. Overall,
the global information security investments are expected to increase from $73.6 billion
in 2016 to $105.6 billion by 2021 with an estimated compound annual growth rate of
more than 7% (Smith and Pike, 2017).
As information security budgets increase along with available investment options,
firms are more concerned about the effectiveness of their investments in information
systems security, and whether their investment portfolio is aimed towards maximizing
returns (Richardson, 2010). This is a challenging process due to several factors, which
involve the difficulty of measuring returns from information security investments, as
well as that of defining the uncertainty around these returns. Moreover, the corresponding decision process is a dynamic one, where technological developments and

vii

increasing sophistication in cyber attacks result in an ever-changing investment environment. Therefore, management of the investment problem in information system
security using quantitative approaches has been seldom addressed in the literature
and in industrial practice. To fill in this gap, in this thesis we study three practical
problems related to information system security investment management.
In the first problem, we address two key decisions by a firm related to information
security technology investments: (1) How much should the firm invest in information
security technology? and (2) How should this investment be allocated over different categories of security technologies? As part of our findings, we derive a simple
functional relationship between the potential total losses of a firm and the optimal
amount that the firm should invest in information systems security. Related to this,
we find that firms in finance, energy, and technology sectors should invest twice more
in trying to detect information security breaches, than in trying to prevent them.
In other industries, information security investments should be split evenly between
preventive and detective measures. Moreover, the overall information security budgets for certain types of firms in the former set of industries should be on average 4%
higher than other industries, even when the potential total losses under a security
breach are the same.
In the second problem, we seek answers to three practical decision problems regarding information sharing in information system security: (1) What is the optimal
level of information sharing for a firm as a function of the firm’s technology investments? (2) What is the value of information sharing in information security? and
(3) How do these findings vary over different operating environments? We build up
a stochastic framework to capture the inter-relationship between information sharing
and technology investments, where the two act as strategic counterparts of information system security. We find that, for firms with pre-fixed technology investment
levels, the optimal information sharing level decreases as the marginal cost of infor-
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mation sharing becomes higher, and there exists a threshold value such that firms
are better off by not sharing information if the marginal cost of information sharing exceeds this threshold value. For the optimal information sharing level, we find
that firms with larger security budgets should share 15% more information, when
compared to optimal sharing levels of small to medium sized firms.
In the third problem, we study pricing strategies under asymmetric information
sharing for information system security, where firms can either share information
with other firms and obtain a monetary compensation for sharing more information
or paying a price for sharing less or even no information. Specifically, we investigate
two practical research questions: (1) What fair price should a firm pay participating
information sharing in asymmetric sharing environment? (2) How would the price of
information vary under different pricing strategies and other influencing factors? To
this end, we develop analytical expressions of a firm’s payoffs under an asymmetric
information sharing environment. We also analyze the pricing of information as a
function of a firm’s technology investment level, its information sharing level, and the
marginal cost of information sharing. Numerical analyses are conducted to identify
the overall benefits to the information sharing firms due to the implementation of
certain pricing strategies.
In conclusion, as one of the few studies on information system security investment problem, we derive managerial insights for both technology investment and
information sharing decisions. The findings of this study is expected to improve the
efficiency of information system security practice and help the firms better defend
against attacks on their information systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Information systems are an integral part of today’s business environment. Businesses, government organizations, and the society rely on these systems for various
transactions, most of which have huge financial implications. Hence, attacks that
breach information systems result in interruption of operations, loss of data and customer confidence, constituting a significant threat to firms.1 .
Such attacks have been increasing in frequency and sophistication over time, and
defending the assets of a firm in response to these attacks has become a key operational
issue. According to Ponemon (2016a), information security attacks cost a typical large
firm $7.7 million per year on average, while Ponemon (2016b) reports that the average
annual total cost of attacks on information systems has increased by 30% between
year 2013 and 2016. In several cases, the cost of an information security attack can
reach very high levels, as evidenced through some recent major breaches released to
the public, such as the Target breach in December 2013 with an estimated cost of $1
billion and the Home Depot breach in September 2014 with an estimated cost of $142
million (Vomhof, 2013). Based on an estimate by Lewis (2018), the global cost of
crime that exploits information systems has exceeded half a trillion dollars per year.
The losses due to attacks on information systems can be mitigated through investments in information security technologies and services. Guttman and Roback
1

While for conciseness purposes we refer to a ‘firm’ throughout the thesis, our discussions and
analyses are applicable to any business, government organization or other institutional establishment
that uses information systems.

1

(1995) and Hoo (2000) define information systems security as an integral element in
the management of a firm, and highlight its importance as a key area for the successful operation of a business. Hence, most firms utilize separate information security
budgets, dedicated for investment towards preserving the assets of the firm against
attacks. While the type of business plays a role in determining the ratio of the information security budget with respect to a firm’s overall information technology budget,
it is well known that this ratio has been steadily increasing over the recent years, along
with the actual dollar value allocated to information security (Peters, 2009, Richardson, 2010). Kessel and Allan (2013) note that 46% of the responding organizations in
a survey reported increases in their information security budgets every year. Overall,
the global information security investments are expected to increase from $73.6 billion
in 2016 to $105.6 billion by 2021 with an estimated compound annual growth rate of
more than 7% (Smith and Pike, 2017).
As information security budgets increase along with available investment options,
firms are more concerned about the effectiveness of their investments in information
systems security, and whether their investment portfolio is aimed towards maximizing
returns (Richardson, 2010). This is a challenging process due to several factors, which
involve the difficulty of measuring returns from information security investments, as
well as that of defining the uncertainty around these returns. Moreover, the corresponding decision process is a dynamic one, where technological developments and
increasing sophistication in cyber attacks result in an ever-changing investment environment. Therefore, management of the investment problem in information system
security using quantitative approaches has been seldom addressed in the literature
and in industrial practice.
To fill in this gap, in this thesis we study three practical problems related to
information system security investment management. The first one is managing technology investment in information system security, and the second and third ones

2

extend the problem to include information sharing among the firms in these operations. In the remainder of this chapter we introduce the methodology adopted for the
quantitative analysis, the background of these two classes of problems and how the
research questions are defined upon them.

1.1

Stochastic Mathematical Programming

The information security environment has an ever-changing nature, which inevitably brings in uncertainty to the information security operations. While many
methods can be applied to make decisions under uncertainty to solve theoretical and
practical problems, in this thesis we choose to use stochastic mathematical programming to study the problem of information security investment management. In the
following paragraphs, we introduce the stochastic mathematical programming method
in a brief manner and provide some references.
Stochastic mathematical programming (SP) is a type of mathematical programming method. The first introduction of SP is by Dantzig (1955), where the author
introduces a resource model that includes a random event as part of the optimization
problem structure. In this model, the solution of the optimization problem is adapted
to different outcomes of the random event, which presents a probabilistic nature of
the problem. Since then, stochastic mathematical programming has become a widely
applied method to solve many of the real-word optimization problems that involve
uncertainty.
Stochastic mathematical programming - as a mathematical optimization modeling
framework - consists of an objective function and a set of constraints. The constraints
can be presented as either equalities or inequalities. Additionally, some parameters
of the stochastic mathematical programming model are random variables. The probability distribution of these random variables are assumed to be known, which is the
most important assumption of the stochastic mathematical programming method. In
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solving the model, an optimal policy is identified that could maximize or minimize the
expected value of the objective function over all possible realizations of the random
parameters.
A very widely applied SP model is the two-stage SP model, where the decision
process is made of two stages. In the first stage, a decision maker takes action without
knowing any information about the realization of the random event. At the beginning
of the second stage, after observing the realized values of the random parameters, the
decision maker is assumed to take second stage follow-up actions in order to fine-tune
the decision made earlier in the first stage.
The two-stage SP model can also be further generalized into a multi-stage SP
model. Similar to the two-stage SP model, in a multi-stage SP model, there is an initial decision made at the beginning of the first stage. Afterwards, as more information
is revealed about the random parameter in every stage, there is always a follow-up decision made at the beginning of the next stage based on newly observed information.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on the two-stage SP model as its modeling framework
fits the information security management structure.
The general formulation of a two-stage SP model is given as

min{g(x) = f (x) + Eξ [Q(x, ξ)]}
x∈X

(1.1)

where Q(x, ξ) is the optimal value of the second-stage problem involving the random
factor ξ such that

Q(x, ξ) ≡ min{q(ξ)|T (ξ)x + W (ξ)y = h(ξ)}.
y

(1.2)

If the objective function and constraints are linear, then a deterministic equivalent of
the above formulation can be written as:
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minn

x∈R

subject to

cT x + Eξ [ minm q(ξ)T y]

(1.3)

Ax = b

(1.4)

T (ξ)x + W (ξ)y = h(ξ)

(1.5)

x ≥ 0,

(1.6)

y∈R

y≥0

Stochastic mathematical programming has been applied to many fields of study
that involves decision making under uncertainty, and the literature contains a wide
variety of references on the theoretical and practical issues of SP. We refer the readers
to these studies for a more detailed discussion on SP, for example Wets (1983), Kall
et al. (1994), Wallace and Ziemba (2005), Birge and Louveaux (2011), and Shapiro
and Dentcheva (2014).

1.2

Technology Investment in Information System Security

There exist different ways that a firm can utilize its information security budget, such as developing its in-house information security systems, acquiring security
measures from a vendor, or outsourcing the information security functions to a third
party (Cezar et al., 2013). In practice, in-house security technology development
tends to be very sophisticated and not amenable to most firms with few exceptions,
while similarly the outsourcing strategy is not favored in many industries (Peters,
2009). Hence, in the first part of this thesis we focus on the most common utilization
of an information security budget by firms: obtaining information security products
through purchases from third-party providers. As part of this process, we mainly
consider strategic product acquisitions, where the firm contracts with select vendors
to acquire different categories of information security measures. This is a typical
process for many firms, as it ensures standardization, utilizes of economies of scale,
and provides streamlined support services.
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As information security budgets increase along with available investment options,
firms are more concerned about the effectiveness of their investments in information
systems security, and whether their investment portfolio is aimed towards maximizing
returns (Richardson, 2010). This is a challenging process due to several factors, which
involve the difficulty of measuring returns from information security investments, as
well as the difficulty of defining the uncertainty around these returns. Moreover, the
corresponding decision process is a dynamic one, where technological developments
and increasing sophistication in cyber attacks result in an ever-changing investment
environment.
However, neither the existing industrial practice nor the academic literature has
been able to produce definitive guidelines on such issues, due to two major challenges
that are unique to information security investments. First, it is not known how to
measure returns from investing in information systems security, and how to characterize the uncertainty around these returns. Second, the corresponding decision
process involves a higher level of dynamics, where technological developments and
increasing sophistication in threats to information systems result in an ever-changing
investment environment. In this thesis, we first address these challenges, and then
develop a framework to provide answers to two relevant operational questions by a
firm: how much should the firm invest in information systems security?, and how
should this investment be allocated over different countermeasure categories?
We address this dynamic decision problem in Chapter 3 by developing a high level
framework aimed at providing guidance to firms when allocating their information
security budgets into different types of investment options. The framework utilizes
potential loss information specific to different industries, as well as general information on the characteristics of different types of attacks and information security
investments. Analysis is then performed using this framework to suggest policies that
would maximize expected returns from information security investments, where risk

6

aspects are also studied through a conditional value at risk approach. As part of our
analyses, we also study different industries separately, and use data to derive generic
policies that would maximize expected returns from information security investments.

1.3

Information Sharing in Information System Security

While firms strive to improve information system security by investing in different
technologies, the increasing sophistication of information system attacks has also
resulted in the need for joint information sharing endeavors among firms. A major
difficulty for firms in defending against advanced information security attacks is the
time gap between the attack and the corresponding response, which can be especially
long when the firm has no previous knowledge of the kind of attack they are facing
(Verizon, 2015). Information sharing, i.e. the practice of passing on experiences and
knowledge of security information among firms, can be an effective approach for firms
to alleviate the impact of this problem. Synthesizing the knowledge and experience
of a larger community allows all parties to defend their assets more effectively against
cyber attacks. It is evident through some past major breaches that such information
sharing could have helped avoid major losses if it had been implemented successfully.
Two such examples involve the Target data breach of December 2013 which cost the
company direct losses of around $1 billion, and the Home Depot breach in September
2014, which resulted in losses of more than $140 million due to exposure of payment
card data. It was later found that these two breaches were actually caused by the
same malware attack, indicating the potential that the latter Home Depot breach
could have been avoided if relevant information had been shared and proper protective
actions had been taken accordingly.
In current practice, information sharing among firms for cybersecurity is mostly
realized by forming alliances within a given industry. Some of these alliances are
formed as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which are specific to
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each industry, such as the Financial Services-ISAC, Information Technology-ISAC,
Healthcare and Public Health-ISAC and the Electric Sector-ISAC. Within each ISAC,
member firms are encouraged to share information on any cyber attack, regardless
of whether an attack was successful or not. The shared information usually includes
methods/countermeasures a firm uses to defend against the attacks, vulnerabilities
in these countermeasures, and methods that a firm applies to minimize the economic
impact after a breach occurs (Gordon et al., 2003). All such information is collected
and summarized by a centralized council within the ISAC and sent to the members
in the form of alerts, guidance and recommendation reports. These reports would
then help ISAC members provide better defense mechanisms against cyber threats,
and reduce overall information security related costs.
Despite the benefits of information sharing in improving information system security, participation in ISACs and other similar alliances is still quite limited among
firms. Some key reasons for this include: (1) the potential risk of losing competitive
advantage due to the information shared with other firms; and (2) lack of economic
incentive due to the difficulties in assessing the monetary value of information sharing, especially since the cost of sharing information in information system security
practice is not negligible. These costs primarily include the fixed cost of joining information sharing alliances, personnel costs spent on security information gathering,
and other relevant costs on information processing to ensure confidentiality in the
information shared.
The first issue noted above is being addressed by standardizing information sharing procedures through legislative efforts, such as the U.S. Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Acts of 2014 and 2015, which aim at creating a trustworthy environment
for firms and other organizations participating in information sharing. The second
issue, however, requires the development of procedures and measures in assessing
the effectiveness of information sharing, especially when considered together with the
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technology investment decisions on information system security. More specifically,
since information sharing and technology investments are two major aspects of information system security practice, there exists an interplay between these two types of
investments. Naturally, information sharing would boost the effectiveness of security
countermeasures. However, as both information sharing and security countermeasures are costly to the firms, there must be a balance as to how much information to
share and how much to invest in technology so that the overall expenditure is minimized. To this end, in this study we seek to answer the following research questions:
What is the optimal level of information sharing for a firm as a function of the firm’s
technology investments?
security?

What is the value of information sharing in information

How do these findings vary over different operating environments? We

address these questions in Chapter 4.

1.4

Asymmetric Information Sharing in Information System
Security

When two or more firms are in an information sharing alliance, the amount of
information that the firms provide might vary due to multiple factors, such as size,
technology investment capacity, and the information security environment for the
firm. As a result, in many cases even the well-intended firms are unable to share the
same level of information as they receive from other firms. In some other cases, a firm
might be inhibited from sharing information due to regulations on privacy protection,
but such a firm might still be in need of shared information to support information
security operations. We refer to such a situation as asymmetric information sharing.
This asymmetry in information sharing levels might reduce the impact of any incentives for sharing information, and can lead to reduced levels of information sharing.
Given this setting, information sharing alliances are confronted with the challenges
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of maintaining a fair information sharing environment, which would ensure similar or
proportional returns for firms in the alliance.
A possible solution to the problem, as discussed by Hendriks (2006), is to impose
charges on the shared information and treat it as a commodity. In this way, firms can
acquire knowledge of attacks and other practical security knowledge from other firms
at a fair price. The firms that share information would then receive compensation
for the shared information, which might serve as a motivation for the continuation of
participation in information sharing.
In the current practice, firms are typically charged a membership fee by Information Sharing and Analysis Centers for participating in information sharing activities.
Although the membership fees for ISACs are calculated based on the sizes of the
firms, the application of a membership fee does not totally address the problems that
may arise due to asymmetric information sharing. First, although the firms are distinguished by their sizes, the level of membership fee being charged does not reflect
the level of information provided or received by individual firms. Second, while the
collected membership fees help maintain the operation of the ISAC, it does not provide monetary compensation to firms that share more information, therefore does not
create a big incentive for continuous information sharing. Lastly, the membership fees
for ISACs do not consider the willingness to pay attitudes of firms that may prefer
not to share as much information, but to purchase such information from other firms.
In this study we aim to address these issues by seeking answers to the following
research questions: What fair price should a firm pay participating information sharing in asymmetric sharing environment? and, How would the price of information
vary under different pricing strategies and other influencing factors? To this end,
in Chapter 5 we develop analytical expressions of a firm’s payoffs under an asymmetric information sharing environment. We also analyze the pricing of information
as a function of a firm’s technology investment level, its information sharing level,
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and the marginal cost of information sharing. Numerical analyses will be conducted
to identify the pricing of information in an information sharing firms with multiple
firms, as well as the overall benefits to the information sharing community due to the
implementation of certain pricing strategies.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter we introduce the related research literature on information security
investment problems, which are categorized as two main aspects of information system security management problem we include in this thesis, namely the information
security technology investment and security information sharing.

2.1

Related Research on Information Security Technology
Investment

Current literature on managing investments for information systems security can
be categorized into three classes: empirical studies, economic approaches, and portfolio approaches. Empirical studies on information security investments are usually
based on extensive surveys or field studies of businesses. Some examples include industry technical reports such as Baker (2009), Richardson (2010), Ponemon (2011),
and Verizon (2014b), where each report contains important statistics about the latest
information security practices, and concludes with brief managerial suggestions for
businesses according to those findings.
The other academic empirical studies tend to focus on particular perspectives.
Kwon and Johnson (2011) analyze the influence of regulatory factors on information
security investment decisions in the healthcare sector, while Baldwin et al. (2013) evaluate the impacts of some widely adopted economic methods on information security
policy. Similarly, Rowe and Gallaher (2006) study information security investment
strategies in the private sector based on a series of field studies. The literature of
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empirical studies typically involves descriptive methods, and serve to provide information that can be used to assess the value of information assets and effectiveness
of countermeasures. Specifically, we refer to several of these studies to characterize
the information assets, attacks and countermeasure categories in our model in order to better reflect the information security practice in reality and obtain general
data-based managerial insights that can be recommended to different types of firms.
The economic approaches have been naturally applied to the information security
investment problem due to its financial nature. The literatures on this topic usually
adopts classical cost-benefit metrics such as net present value (NPV), return on investment (ROI) and internal rate of return (IRR), which are selectively adopted by firms
as decision aids for information security investment planning in practice (Gordon and
Loeb, 2005). Gordon and Loeb (2002) first proposes a general ROI information investment model based on simple assumptions and concluded that information security
investments of a firm should not exceed 37% of the total information security related
potential losses. This result has been further discussed and compared by several studies under different restrictive conditions, such as Hausken (2006), Willemson (2006),
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008), Huang et al. (2008). Some other studies use gametheoretical approaches to maximize the information security payoffs by analyzing the
intentions and interactions between the firm and potential hackers (Cavusoglu et al.,
2004, 2008, Gao et al., 2013, 2015).
However, these economic studies tend to leave out some of the key characteristics of
information security investments, such as budget limitations and specific attributes of
different types of countermeasures. Besides, the economic models usually assumes the
countermeasures to be acting independently, hence cannot capture the possible joint
effects of combining countermeasures with different specifics. In terms of modeling
of the information security attacks, many of the game-theoretical approaches focus
on customized malicious attacks, but ignores a vast majority of other breaches that
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are triggered by non-malicious, non-targeting attacks. In our analysis, we utilize an
ROI structure similar to the study of Gordon and Loeb (2002) when defining the
general problem framework, but use a portfolio approach to achieve a more detailed
and realistic investment setting involving budget constraints, different specifications
of investment options, synergy effects of countermeasure combinations and a complete
spectrum of attacks under an uncertain information security environment.
With much more complex and comprehensive problem set-ups, the literature using portfolio approaches to model information security investments have been rare.
Studies using this approach typically model the information security investments as
allocating funds into several investment options with different investment levels. Hoo
(2000) first describes a framework consisting of multiple ‘safeguards’ impacting ‘bad
events’. The study uses an influence diagram and analyzes several alternative investment policies under budget limitations. A similar study is Rees et al. (2011), where
the authors develop a decision tool to capture investment-return trade-offs and search
for a near-optimal countermeasure portfolio using a genetic algorithm. Sawik (2013)
builds a mixed integer model to study the selection of information security countermeasures with pre-fixed investment levels over a set of predefined risk cases. Another
distinctive work is Garvey and Patel (2014), where the authors propose a series of
frameworks to evaluate an information security system’s performance and its economic benefits via analytical hierarchy process. A set of information security options
is then selected according to these measures through a portfolio-based approach.
While these studies all aim to provide optimal investment strategies to information security practitioners, they usually build the models without considering specific
features of the investment options, i.e., countermeasures. For studies using optimization methods, the synergistic effects of multiple countermeasure combinations have
been seldom addressed in these models. Furthermore, it is difficult to incorporate
uncertainties in these models to present the evolving nature of information security
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attacks as it would expand the complexity of the models. Our work adds to the existing studies by considering a holistic mapping over different categories of information
assets, attacks, and countermeasures, while also capturing the uncertainty and risk
in the changing information security environment. Unlike any of the existing studies,
we aim to provide firm-specific recommendations for information security investments
that can be directly applied to their operational decision making settings. A summary of the main contributions of this chapter is illustrated in Table 2.1, where we list
different studies in the literature and specify the properties addressed in each study.

2.2

Related Research on Information Sharing in Information
System Security

The information sharing problem is first discussed in the economics literature.
Clarke (1983) and Gal-Or (1985) study information sharing behaviors by oligopoly
firms and derive similar conclusions that the mutual sharing of information does not
happen spontaneously among firms despite the maximization of joint welfare. However, some studies focus on certain natural incentives for sharing information, and
show that sharing information would be easily implementable under certain conditions. For example, Li (1985) finds that if all the firms have access to equally accurate
information, then a firm would be willing to share some firm-specific information.
Also, Shapiro (1986) suggests that the sharing of cost information can be made possible by firms joining an association with an information-sharing agreement. These
studies from the economics literature, although not directly related to information
security, provide important insights that can be applied to information sharing in
cybersecurity, and we use these insights to help develop the modeling framework in
this chapter.
As part of the of operations research literature, the topic of information sharing is
widely studied within supply chain management. Initially motivated by the bullwhip
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Table 2.1: Summary of existing literature on information security investment and
contributions of this study

!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!

!

Application of results and analyses to different industries

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Use data obtained from real information
security practice
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!
!
!
!
!

!
! !
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
! !
!
! !

Provide decision-making tool for direct use
by the firms

!
!
!
!
!

!

Use optimization

!

!
!
!
!
!

Include uncertainty in the model

!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Differentiate the specifics of countermeasures

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Consider both malicious and non-malicious
attacks

Use economic models to measure investment returns
Baker (2009)
Richardson (2010)
Ponemon (2011)
Verizon (2014b)
Kwon and Johnson (2011)
Rowe and Gallaher (2006)
Gordon and Loeb (2005)
Gordon and Loeb (2002)
Willemson (2006)
Hausken (2006)
Bojanc and Jerman-Blažič (2008)
Huang et al. (2008)
Cavusoglu et al. (2004)
Cavusoglu et al. (2008)
Gao et al. (2013)
Gao et al. (2015)
Hoo (2000)
Rees et al. (2011)
Sawik (2013)
Garvey and Patel (2014)
This study

!
!

!

effect in supply chains, Lee et al. (1997) propose the sharing of information between
supply chain partners in order to improve efficiency and reduce costs. Assuming a
coordinated structure across the supply chain, the value of information sharing within
the supply chain is investigated by some follow-on studies such as Gavirneni et al.
(1999), Lee et al. (2000), and Yu et al. (2001). Considering the competitive environment among the supply chain members, some studies further explore the incentives
for information sharing. It is generally recognized that firms tend not to share information voluntarily, but rather seek for cooperation or trade for shared information
from other firms (Chen, 2003, Li, 2002, Shang et al., 2015). The findings on the
supply chain information sharing problem also shed light on the problem of security
information sharing. In this study, we focus on the motivation, value and incentives
of information sharing in the context of information security, while also noting that
there exist clear differences between these two types of information sharing.
Information sharing in information security has been rarely discussed in detail in
the literature. The study by Gordon and Loeb (2002) is among the earliest studies
about information sharing in cybersecurity. The paper compares the sharing of information for information security purposes and for general commercial purposes, and
points out the necessity of a central coordinator in the practice of security information
sharing. While it is unanimously agreed in the literature that a central coordinator
is needed for cybersecurity information sharing among the firms, Hausken (2007) and
Gao et al. (2014) discuss the role of the central coordinator further by considering
a situation where the central coordinator has control over information security investments and information sharing at the same time. They conclude that higher
levels of intervention by the central coordinator does not always lead to better joint
welfare. Therefore, in our study, we design the role of the central coordinator to
be flexible with moderate level of power such that it intervenes only for information
sharing purposes. Gordon et al. (2003) study the impact of information sharing on
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information security investments using a game-theoretic model, and determine the
conditions under which information sharing promotes or hinders information security
investments. The authors in that study assume that there is a relationship between
information sharing level and the effectiveness of information security investments.
This key assumption lays the foundation for the modeling of information security
investment and information sharing, and is adopted in several other studies including
this study. Inspired by the rising trend of promoting information security information
sharing, Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) and Gao and Zhong (2016) conduct studies on the
incentives for sharing security information in a competitive environment. Using similar game-theoretical approaches, these papers analyze the information sharing and
investment behaviors of a specific industry, namely the information technology industry, where product demand and revenue are directly affected by information security
performance. Conclusions are drawn about the benefits of security information sharing to the firms, and it is noted that joint value is maximized with the firms sharing
information in a coordinated manner. These findings, although valuable from public policy perspective, have their applications limited to the information technology
industry. In our work, we develop a generic model that can be used by a wide spectrum of industries whose core business does not necessarily relate to the marketing
of information technology products.

2.3

Related Research on Asymmetric Information Sharing
and Information Pricing

While the topic of asymmetric information sharing in information system security
has been rarely discussed in the literature, several studies involving applications in
other fields exist. Sharpe (1990) studies the impact of asymmetric information in the
bank loaning practice, where the banks are more willing to lend to return customers
than new customers, as they have less information about the latter. The study
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concludes that the inefficiency caused by information asymmetry can be eliminated
by signing special contracts with all customers that contain protection terms against
future problems. Brunnermeier (2001) does a thorough review on research articles
regarding asset pricing under asymmetric information for assets such as real estate or
stocks, and emphasize the information aspects of asset price dynamics. The author
describes several models including market microstructure models, dynamic models,
and herding models, and demonstrate how asymmetric information affects asset prices
as well as how to find optimal trading strategies. Different from the above literature,
the asymmetric information in our study is not used for generating extra revenue
for the firm, but to help reduce overall information security costs. In our work we
also treat the asymmetric information itself as a commodity, and the pricing strategy
is applied to this special commodity while considering the asymmetry aspects in
information .
The pricing of information has also been discussed in the economic literature under a buyer-seller context. Varian (1996) studies the selling of information containing
products such as electronic journals. The author concludes that a firm can generate additional revenue by providing different information contents at different prices.
While the concept of variation in information containing products is somewhat similar to the variation in information sharing levels in information system security, the
information that is being priced by Varian (1996) is not assumed to create any measurable revenue for the buyer as in this study. Arora and Fosfuri (2005), on the other
hand, study the pricing of information where the information would help the buyer
make better investment decisions. A simple optimal pricing strategy is found as the
charging of a fixed price to buyers with high expected returns while for buyers with
low expected returns the price is defined as a portion of their future revenue. Unlike
these studies, the participants in our context do not have fixed roles as buyers or sellers, but can switch their roles by changing their information sharing level. Therefore,

19

the optimal pricing strategy in our study is expected to be affected by many factors
in addition to the return on investment levels.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR TECHNOLOGY
INVESTMENT IN INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY

In this chapter, we address two key decisions by a firm related to information security technology investments: how much should the firm invest in information security
technology?, and how should this investment be allocated over different categories of
security technologies? To this end, we derive a simple functional relationship between
the potential total losses of a firm and the optimal amount that the firm should invest in information systems security. We further model the technology investments
in information system security using a two-stage stochastic programming model, and
conduct policy analysis using real data.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as the follows: In Section 3.1 we introduce a general framework for technology investments in information system security
practice, and in Section 3.2, we present a stochastic programming model for the problem. Detailed policy analyses using real data are presented in Section 3.3. Finally, in
Section 3.4 we summarize our results and present the conclusions.

3.1

General Framework for Investing in Information Systems
Security

Effective protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of a firm’s
information systems, which is the main objective of information systems security,
requires systematic investment and resource allocation decisions by the firm. In this
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section, we present a generic framework defining such information security investment
decisions, and how an optimization model can be built upon them.

3.1.1

Components of the Framework

We start the construction of our framework by identifying the key components
that define the investment environment for information systems security. These include information assets that a firm holds, attacks that target these assets, and countermeasures that a firm can deploy to protect its assets against such attacks. We
utilize a higher level categorization structure in defining the different components in
our framework in order to allow for identification of general insights applicable to a
broad range of situations. Otherwise, a lower level abstraction of the inputs would
imply more of a custom and specific analysis for the organization studied, rather than
generic findings for different industries.
Assets. A firm’s assets in our context refer to the collection of systems and
information the firm possesses as part of business operations, with three defining
characteristics for each asset: confidentiality, integrity, availability. Noting the distinction of confidentiality among the three aspects, Herson et al. (2003) suggest that
a firm’s information assets can be grouped broadly as being either confidential or
non-confidential. Confidential assets correspond to data containing information that
should not be disclosed to any third parties. This can include customer personal data,
intellectual property, and other restricted files. On the other hand, non-confidential
assets refer to any other assets that have monetary value and relate to information
system availability and integrity, such as functional hardware. We adopt this categorization as part of our policy analyses in Section 3.3.
Attacks. Attacks correspond to all types of threats to a firm’s information systems. A commonly adopted classification of attacks on information systems is a threeshell structure proposed by Richardson (2010), with the inner shell representing basic
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attacks, the middle shell representing malware attacks and outer shell representing
more sophisticated or advanced attacks. Basic attacks are typically simple and opportunistic attacks that are pervasively spread to the public to exploit vulnerabilities
in information systems. Malware attacks, on the other hand, are an extended version
of the basic attacks, which have some level of customization based on the industry
targeted. Advanced attacks are usually the most sophisticated attacks and are generally customized for an individual organization. Richardson (2010) notes that most
malware attacks would also fall into the category of advanced attacks, because malware attacks are likely to be customized as well, making the boundary between the
two kinds of attacks somewhat vague. Hence, in our analysis we include malware
attacks as part of the advanced attacks, and use two main categorizations for attacks
on information systems, namely the basic and advanced attacks.
Countermeasures. Information security countermeasures are the set of measures protecting a firms information assets against attacks. They include both security technologies and ‘soft’ security measures such as establishing policies and training
employees. Based on the protection mechanism used, Stoneburner et al. (2002) classify the types of countermeasures into two major categories: preventive and detective
countermeasures. Preventive countermeasures include methods such as biometrics,
encryption, and access control lists, and are aimed at preparing the firm against attacks before any breach can take place. On the other hand, detective countermeasures
are aimed at identifying and removing an attack during or after the occurrence of a
breach. Such measures include tools such as anti-virus software, content monitoring
tools, and intrusion detection systems. Note that the soft measures mentioned above
can be classified into either countermeasure category, depending on the nature of the
measure. In this study, we enumerate some most common countermeasures based on
findings from the literature and data obtained from our collaborating organizations.
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Figure 3.1: Cross-relationships between the information assets of a firm, attacks
targeting these assets, and countermeasures that can be deployed against the attacks.
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A list of these countermeasures and their classifications into the two categories are
provided in Table 3.1 as part of the discussion in Section 3.3.1.
The three major components of information systems security is connected by multidimensional cross-relationships as illustrated in Figure 3.1. As shown, the two major
categories of assets can be targeted by both basic and advanced attacks, while both
preventive and detective countermeasures can be deployed against the two categories
of attacks. Hence, a firm’s information security investment strategy, i.e. how much
to invest in each type of countermeasure, should depend on the distribution of the
potential losses over the basic and advanced attacks, denoted by las where a and s respectively refer to the attack and asset type, as well as the effectiveness of each type of
countermeasure on these attack categories, denoted by eoa with o and a representing
the countermeasure and attack type.
Clearly, the distributions of attack types and information assets would vary for
different types of firms. We specifically consider ten representative industries covering
a quite wide spectrum of organizations prone to attacks on their information systems,
namely finance, retail, hospitality, healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, professional services, public sector, information technology and energy industries. These ten
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Figure 3.2: Representation of the dynamic decision process for information security
investments of a firm.
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major industries are identified and described by a series of reports published by Verizon Communications (Verizon, 2012, 2014a). Under our general modeling framework
and methodology, the conclusions and insights obtained by studying these ten industries can shed light on a great variety of firms based on the information environment
and protection objectives they operate under.

3.1.2

The Investment Decision Process

Investment in information systems security is an iterative multi-step procedure
involving the three components introduced above. In Figure 3.2 we provide a visual
representation of the typical steps involved in this dynamic process, which we further
describe below.
The process starts with the firm assessing the value of its assets, which corresponds to the maximum possible loss that the firm can incur due to a breach of its
information systems. The next step is the estimation of the expected costs for perfect
protection (ECOPP). This step involves an assessment of the costs of providing the
highest level of protection for the firm’s information systems without considering any
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budget limitations. These two measures serve as inputs in addressing the first key
operational decision presented in the third step: how much should the firm invest
in information systems security?. Knowing this optimal investment level, the firm
considers all relevant factors, and decides on the allocation of the budget over the
set of countermeasures identified for potential investment. This step provides answers to the second key operational question: how should the information security
budget be allocated over different countermeasure categories?. After the identification and implementation of an investment portfolio, the firm continuously observes
the cybersecurity dynamics and learns about the effectiveness of the implemented
countermeasures. The investment portfolio is then updated as necessary at specific
intervals. Our analysis in this study captures these dynamics by modeling learning
effects and portfolio adjustment options under a stochastic optimization framework,
and aims to provide insights for the two key operational decisions highlighted above.

3.2

Stochastic Modeling of Information Security Investments

We assume that a firm maintains a set S = {s1 , s2 } of information assets, where
s1 corresponds to confidential assets, while s2 refers to non-confidential assets as described in Section 3.1.1. The assets of the firm are subject to a set A = {a1 , a2 }
of attacks with a1 and a2 referring to basic and advanced attacks, respectively. The
expected loss las due to an attack a ∈ A on asset s ∈ S represents the value to be
protected and is typically expressed in dollars. This value can be estimated by considering all possible expenditures that would result due to the consequences caused by
an attack. Such expenses might consist of staff time, additional labor, compensation
and other services provided to customers, as well as any reduction in the market share
of the firm due to reputation related impacts.
In response to the potential attacks on its information systems, the firm deploys
a set O = {o1 , o2 } of countermeasures, consisting of detective and preventive security
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the change in the effectiveness eoa of a countermeasure
category as a function of investment xo in that category, and the impact of αo .
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measures denoted respectively as o1 and o2 . Each countermeasure type o ∈ O has an
estimated level of effectiveness eoa (xo ) on attack type a ∈ A, which is a function of the
amount xo invested in countermeasure type o. The effectiveness function eoa (xo ) is
defined separately for each attack and countermeasure pair, and refers to the percent
reduction of losses on any information asset due to attack type a achieved by utilizing
countermeasure type o. For example, eo1 a1 (xo1 ) = 0.8 would imply that an 80% reduction in potential losses can be achieved against basic attacks by investing xo1 dollars
in detective countermeasures. It is worthwhile noting that the countermeasures are
designed towards protection against different types of attacks, as opposed to being
designed for specific information assets. Hence, the effectiveness of a countermeasure
is defined separately for each type of attack, and is independent of the asset type the
countermeasure might be protecting.

3.2.1

Functional Representation of Countermeasure Effectiveness and Information Asset Loss

An important issue relates to the definition of the effectiveness function eoa (xo )
for each information security countermeasure and attack type. First, we note that
while a theoretical upper bound for eoa (xo ) would be 1, such an effectiveness level
is practically not achievable. Hence, we let βoa < 1 denote the maximum attainable
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effectiveness by countermeasure type o ∈ O against attack type a ∈ A. Given this,
the effectiveness function eoa (xo ) must satisfy the following conditions, as also noted
by Gordon and Loeb (2002): eoa (0) = 0; eoa (xo ) → βoa as xo → ∞;
∂ 2 eoa (xo )
∂x2o

∂eoa (xo )
∂xo

> 0; and

< 0 for all o ∈ O and a ∈ A. These properties imply that the function eoa (xo )

has to be concave and monotonically increasing on xo ∈ [0, ∞), while asymptotically
achieving the highest effectiveness level βoa . Based on these conclusions, we define
the following function to model the effectiveness rate of a countermeasure category
against a given type of attack on information systems:
eoa (xo ) = βoa − e−(αo xo −ln βoa ) = βoa − βoa e−αo xo

∀o∈O,a∈A

(3.1)

where αo is the marginal rate that the effectiveness curve reaches the maximum level
βoa as a function of the investment xo . In other words, for the same maximum achievable effectiveness level βoa , high values of αo would imply that the higher effectiveness
levels can be achieved through less investment than a case with lower αo values. This
is demonstrated visually through an example in Figure 3.3.
While the effectiveness function for a countermeasure category o on attack type
a corresponds to a relative measure defining the percent decrease in potential losses
due to the utilization of such countermeasures, the return from an investment in a
countermeasure needs to be defined in absolute terms in dollars. Given the expected
maximum possible loss las due to attack type a on information asset s, we define
the realized losses after countermeasure implementation as fa las (1 − eoa (xo )), where
fa represents the frequency of attack type a based on the estimated number of such
attacks during the planning period. The loss reduction here is a result of reduced
number of successful attacks, and this leads to a multiplicative form for the total overP P
Q
all losses, expressed as s a fa las ( o (1 − eoa (xo ))). We can visualize this structure
by conceiving the information security countermeasures as layers of fences, through
which the attack infiltrates but gets weakened in terms of expected impact layer after
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layer. Assuming that the countermeasures will be functioning separately, the attack
confronted by the next layer is always what is left after the screening by the previous
layer. Thus, the contribution of the next layer to the overall effectiveness can be
defined through multiplication of its effectiveness by what is left. We provide a visual
illustration of this representation in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Layer based structural illustration of the effectiveness provided by multiple
types of countermeasures

Effectiveness of
Countermeasure 1

Effectiveness of
Countermeasure 2

Joint effectiveness of
Countermeasure 1&2

Building upon this protection process, we further consider joint effectiveness of
information security countermeasures as a separate layer in the system, as joint effectiveness of two countermeasures against an attack is not necessarily the product
of their individual effectiveness rates. One can view the joint effectiveness of two
countermeasures as a virtual layer added to the individual countermeasure effectiveness layers. To capture this structure, we define the interdependency coefficient ρoo0
for two countermeasure categories o, o0 ∈ O, and use it to represent the loss under
p
joint effectiveness between the two countermeasures as fa las 1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ), where
eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) ∈ [0, 1] and is defined as:

eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = ρoo0 eoa (xo ) + ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 ) − ρ2oo0 eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )
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∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A

(3.2)

We note through Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1 below that this representation is
generic, and can be used to represent any type of joint effectiveness relationship
between two countermeasure types.
Lemma 3.1 Given investment levels xo and xo0 on two information security countermeasures o and o0 , the joint effectiveness function (3.2) is nondecreasing in ρoo0 ,
eoa (xo ) and eo0 a (xo0 ) for all ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }].
o a

Proof All proofs are included in Appendix A. 
Proposition 3.1 Given a pair of information security countermeasures with individual effectiveness functions eoa (xo ) and eo0 a (xo0 ), there always exists ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }]
o a

such that the joint effectiveness function eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) can be defined for all values of
xo and xo0 .
In practice, the parameter ρoo0 can be estimated based on expert opinions, usually
developed through observations of historical performances of the countermeasures.
When two countermeasure types o and o0 have no correlation, ρoo0 is assumed to be
0. In the case where there exist joint effects, ρoo0 takes a positive value. Note that
the relationship between any two countermeasures is assumed to be either neutral or
synergistic, i.e. one never impeding another. Thus, ρoo0 takes a value in the interval
[0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }]. In our analyses in Section 3.3, we utilize a specific value estimated
o a

for ρoo0 based on available data, but also consider sensitivity analysis around this
value to develop additional insights.
The structure above also allows the joint effectiveness function to be expressed
through a nice implicit multiplicative form as follows:

1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = (1 − ρoo0 eoa (xo ))(1 − ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 ))

∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A

(3.3)

which in turn enables a compact expression of the overall loss function for the inforp
mation assets of the firm. Note that defining ρoo = 1, the term 1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
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reduces to 1 − eoa (xo ) when o = o0 . Hence, in order to express the total losses after information security investments by taking into account the joint effectiveness
P P
Q
functions, we modify the total loss expression s a fa las ( o (1 − eoa (xo ))) as:
!
L(x) =

XX

fa las

s∈S a∈A

Y p
1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )

(3.4)

o,o0 ∈O

where x represents the vector defining the investments in different countermeasure
categories.
3.2.2

Modeling the Dynamics of Information Security Countermeasure
Effectiveness

Information systems have an ever-changing nature, inevitably bringing in uncertainty to the process of investing in information security. The most significant uncertainty involves the effectiveness of countermeasures both due to the dynamic nature
of attacks and also due to the probabilistic evolution of success in defending a firm’s
information assets against these attacks.
Given that attack patterns might evolve over time, we introduce a time dimension into the attack frequency as fa (t) which allows for non-homogeneity in attack
frequencies over time. In response, countermeasures are also designed to be updated
frequently in order to adapt to the evolution of the attacks, resulting in a life cycle based variation in a countermeasure’s maximum attainable effectiveness βoa over
time. Hence, we also update the definition of this parameter so that it might vary
as a function of time t, specifically as βoa (t). However, the exact nature of this
countermeasure effectiveness life cycle curve is not known to a firm, which can only
be estimated probabilistically for use as part of the information security investment
planning process, as we later describe in Section 3.2.3.
The widely applied notion of product life cycle curve is first introduced by Rogers
(2010) to describe the diffusion of product innovation, where a life cycle curve is par31

Countermeasure effectiveness

Figure 3.5: Five phases of the information security product life cycle curve defined
similarly to Rogers (2010).
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titioned into five phases as shown in Figure 3.5. Technologies for information systems
security also have effectiveness levels that vary depending on where the product is in
its life cycle. Noting that security products are mostly well tested after development
and become obsolete relatively fast after the late maturity phase, we follow Lipner
(2004) and consider a three phase life cycle for the effectiveness of information security countermeasures. These phases correspond to early adopters, early maturity,
and late maturity phases as illustrated in Figure 3.6a. In the early adopter phase,
the countermeasure is first introduced to the market, while at the early maturity
phase the product gets gradually accepted and improved through market experience.
Lastly, at the late maturity phase, the countermeasure is challenged and eventually
replaced by competing products, resulting in its obsolescence.
The specific shape of the effectiveness life cycle curve is different for preventive and
detective technologies. Oberheide et al. (2008) suggest that detective countermeasures
tend to have a sharp drop in their effectiveness towards the end of the product’s life
cycle. This is because such products are dependent on continuous updates by vendors,
e.g. anti-virus and anti-spyware applications relying on signature information about
the latest virus database, so that the infiltrated attacks can be detected in a timely
manner. Thus, the effectiveness of these countermeasures drop at a higher rate once
such updates stop. Preventive countermeasures, on the other hand, are more robust
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Figure 3.6: Life cycle curves for information security products based on effectiveness
against attacks.
(b) Effectiveness life-cycle curves for the
two major categories of information security countermeasures.

(a) Three stages of a countermeasure lifecycle curve.
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in the late maturity phase as their effectiveness relies primarily on the product design
itself, as opposed to being dependent on continuous updates, such as in the cases
of encryption algorithms and access control techniques. A firm typically contracts
with the same information security countermeasure provider for a general category
of products due to cost and standardization purposes. Therefore, it is expected
that a specific category of countermeasures provided by a supplier would follow a
specific life cycle curve. Considering these characteristics, as well as product life
cycle information available at McAfee (2013) and Symantec (2014), it is possible to
plot general representative maximum effectiveness life cycle curves for preventive and
detective countermeasures separately. These curves depicting βoa (t) for the two cases
are shown in Figure 3.6b. We provide more details on these effectiveness curves in
Section 3.3.1.

3.2.3

Modeling the Uncertainty in Information Security Countermeasure
Effectiveness

While the maximum attainable effectiveness of a countermeasure will generally
follow a life cycle curve, exact information on the shape of this curve or where a
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Figure 3.7: Uncertainty and learning in information security investments.
(b) Demonstration of different realizations of βoa (t) in the second period, after initial investment and learning in
the first period.

(a) The two-stage decision process representing the uncertainty and learning
in information security investments.
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specific product is placed on that curve at the time of acquisition and implementation is not known due to the uncertainties associated with technological performance.
As a product is put to use and its performance over time is observed, the firm will
gain knowledge about this information, specifically as to where the product might
be on its life cycle curve. This new information can be used to readjust budget allocations over different countermeasure types. Hence, when selecting countermeasures
for investment, the firm needs to account for such uncertainty and the corresponding
learning process that will take place.
The above effects can be captured through a two-stage process, where the firm
makes an initial investment over a set of countermeasure categories, and then can
readjust these investments based on endogenous information about the performance
of the measures invested in. This process is depicted in Figure 3.7a, where an estimate
for the parameter βoa (t) for each countermeasure category o and attack type a is
assumed to be revealed in the second stage for future periods, and the revised decisions
are based on these revelations. We further describe this process through the case
shown in Figure 3.7b. As depicted in the figure, the decision maker assumes that the
countermeasure effectiveness curve follows the segments of an ‘expected’ effectiveness
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function in the first stage. The five possible realizations at the second stage can be
either a large forward shift, a small forward shift, a no shift case, a small backward
shift, or a large backward shift. The backward and forward shifts correspond to life
cycle curves that respectively indicate less and more maturity at the start of the
implementations, implying that the firm’s initial assumptions on the structure of the
life cycle curve were not accurate.
In this two-stage stochastic setup, each combination of life cycle curve realizations
for the countermeasure-attack pairs correspond to a scenario, as two countermeasure
types are not necessarily equally sensitive to different attacks. In other words, the
effectiveness curves and their realizations are considered not for each countermeasure,
but for each countermeasure-attack pair separately.

3.2.4

Two-stage Stochastic Programming Model with Endogenous Uncertainty

The decision framework described above can be modeled through a stochastic
programming approach involving endogenous uncertainty, where the latter is due to
the dependence between the investment decisions made and the realization of learning
effects on the performance of different information security countermeasures. We
assume that a certain level of investment is necessary for information gathering on
the performance of the acquired countermeasures.
First, in order to describe the dynamics involving changes of the parameters βoa (t)
over time, we discretize the planning horizon and represent such dynamics by using
discrete time intervals. We let t = 1, 2, . . . , T refer to each of these intervals, and
append the definition of the maximum effectiveness level and the attack frequency
through the addition of a time subscript as βoat and fat , respectively. Based on a
typical budget planning process that takes place every year with an initial assessment
of the investments at the end of the first quarter, it can be assumed that the second
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stage decisions would take place after this initial assessment. For a generalized formulation, we assume that the second stage decisions occur at the end of time period
T 0 , which implies that periods 1, 2, . . . , T 0 correspond to first stage periods, while the
second stage periods are T 0 + 1, T 0 + 2, . . . , T . We refer to the set of time periods in
each stage as T 1 and T 2 , respectively.
It was described in Section 3.2.3 that the uncertainty structure in the model
involves a set of scenarios, each of which corresponds to a possible combination of life
cycle curve realizations βoat for t ∈ T 2 for different countermeasure-attack category
pairs. We denote a given scenario by ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is the set of all scenarios, and
append the notation for the uncertain parameter βoat with a scenario index to read as
βoatω . Similarly, all second stage variables in the problem need to be defined through
a scenario index, as they correspond to decisions that will be implemented after the
realization of the scenario outcome. These decision variables are further described
later in this section.
As noted above, our framework aims to capture the learning effects on the effectiveness of the countermeasures that are implemented after the initial investment
period, which are dependent on the amount of investment made into a countermeasure category. In other words, enough sampling needs to occur to reach a conclusion
as to where a certain category of countermeasures is on the corresponding life cycle,
and this can only be achieved by making sufficient investment in that category. We
refer to this sufficient level of investment for a countermeasure category o as θo . If
the initial investment in a countermeasure category is less than the threshold θo , then
no information will be gained and the later period investments will be made based
on the life cycle structure initially assumed, although in reality the effectiveness of
the countermeasure category may be different than these assumed levels. Given that
the realization of new information is dependent on the investment decisions made,
this implies a setting with endogenous uncertainty (Solak et al., 2010). To model
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this structure in our formulation, we define the binary variable σo for each o ∈ O,
where it takes on a value of 1 if x1o ≥ θo , and 0 otherwise, where x1o corresponds
to the initial period investment in countermeasure category o. Note that we define
the investment decisions separately for the first and second stages as x1o and x2ω
o respectively, where the latter variable is defined for each scenario as these decisions are
made after scenario realizations.
Moreover, the process of investing in information systems security takes place
under certain constraints. A key limitation deals with the budget constraint such
that the total investment over the planning period can not be larger than a total
available budget B. Moreover, the actual investment plan can always be influenced
by external factors, such as minimum protection requirements imposed by laws or
regulations. To that end, we define the parameters xo and eoa to represent lower
bounds on the investments and effectiveness rates for each countermeasure o ∈ O
against attack a ∈ A.
Given these definitions, a stochastic programming formulation for the information
security investment problem can be expressed as follows, where x1o is also defined over
1ω
all scenarios as x1ω
o for a more compact representation of the formulation. Each xo is

then set equal to each other through nonanticipativity constraints used in stochastic
programming. We also define the set K = {1, 2} to contain the stage indices in the
following formulation:
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X
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ω
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(3.5)
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x1ω
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In this model, the objective function (3.5) involves the minimization of the sum of
the investment costs and expected losses of the firm over the planning horizon. This
represents the expected total expenditure or total cost under information security
investment. The risk attitude of the decision maker is assumed to be risk neutral
in this representation, whereas we describe the inclusion of risk in the framework
in Section 3.2.6. Constraints (3.6) through (3.8) define the effectiveness of countermeasures in both joint and individual forms. Note that the maximum achievable
effectiveness level βoat in (3.8) is replaced by its second stage counterpart bωoat , which
is a variable defined by equation (3.9). This relationship stipulates bωoat to be realized as the scenario-dependent value βoatω only if σo = 1, i.e. if investment in a
countermeasure category is greater than the corresponding threshold. Otherwise, no
information is revealed so that βoat will still be used in the second stage. Constraints
(3.10) reflect the minimum protection requirements imposed by external factors in
terms of countermeasure effectiveness and investment levels in both the first and sec38

ond stages. Constraints (3.11), where M denotes a tight bound as in typical big-M
formulations, define the binary variable σo . Constraints (3.12) state the investment
budget limitation over the entire planning horizon, while constraints (3.13) are the
nonanticipativity constraints that ensure that first stage decisions are the same for
all scenarios.
In the form presented above, our model is a mixed integer nonlinear program with
a non-convex feasible set and objective function, as can be inferred from the presence
of square root functions and products of variables. However, we derive a tractable
convex reformulation of the problem as described in the next subsection.

3.2.5

Linearization of the Nonlinear Stochastic Programming Formulation

In the above formulation, objective function (3.5) and the constraints (3.6)-(3.8)
involve nonlinearities, which we linearize through a set of systematic procedures.
We first express the objective function (3.5) through an equivalent representation as
follows:
#

"
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(3.14)
which follows from
√ kω kω kω
Y q
Q
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kω
kω kω
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kω
kω
kω
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kω
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Given the relationship defined by (3.3), we can replace the term ln 1 − ekω
oo0 at (xo , xo0 )



kω
kω
kω
with a variable Eoo
0 at (xo , xo0 ), and replace constraint (3.6) with the following con-

straint:
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kω
kω
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kω
kω
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0 at (xo , xo0 ) = Ioo0 at (xo ) + Io0 oat (xo0 )
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(3.15)
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kω
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through a set of linear constraints:
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Proposition 3.2 The function Ioo
0 at (xo ) = ln(1 − ρoo0 eoat (xo )) is convex in xo .

Based on this result, and the fact that the optimization problem has a minimizakω
kω
tion objective, Ioo
0 at (xo ) can be approximated in a piecewise linear fashion by a series

of M constraints. Specifically for k = 1, we have:
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kω
where the parameters ukω
oo0 at,m and voo0 at,m respectively represent the slopes and inter-

cepts for the piecewise linear constraints. Note that this piecewise representation of
kω
kω
Ioo
0 at (xo ) implies the removal of constraints (3.7)-(3.9) from the formulation. How-

ever, a challenge is brought by constraints (3.8) and (3.9), as bωoat is dependent on the
binary variable σo . Therefore, the piecewise approximation of constraint (3.8) needs
to be achieved by the design of two sets of switching constraints using σo itself for
k = 2:
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(3.18)
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As a final step, we transform the remaining nonlinear term of e 2
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Overall, the linearized formulation for the information security investment optimization problem can be expressed as:
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s.t. (3.10) − (3.13), (3.15) − (3.20)

3.2.6

Inclusion of Risk in the Decision Framework

Risk, defined by the variation of returns over different realizations of uncertainty,
is indispensable in any type of investment problem, supplementary to the expected
return values. While investments in information systems security do not generate
additional direct revenue to the firm as in a standard investment problem, risk concerns are very important for such investments due to the possibility of huge losses for
a firm. We capture the risk attitude of a decision maker in our framework through
minimization of the conditional value at risk (CVaR) measure, which represents the
expected loss that will be incurred if the realized losses lie in the top 1 − ξ percentile
of the total loss distribution. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) discuss the minimization of conditional value at risk in portfolio optimization and describe a formulation
structure, which has also been adopted in some other studies (e.g. Noyan (2012)).
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Extending this methodology, we express a linearized formulation for the information
security investment optimization problem with conditional value at risk as follows:
"
min

v,η,x,E,I,D,Y∈R+ ,σ∈{0,1}
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2

(3.22)
∀ω ∈ Ω

(3.23)

o∈O

(3.10) − (3.13), (3.15) − (3.20)

The optimization model under risk minimizes a weighted sum of the expected
total costs and conditional value at risk under the uncertainty of countermeasure
effectiveness. In the formulation above, λ denotes the weight parameter, while η is
the variable defining the threshold to be used for calculation of the conditional value
at risk. In other words, η corresponds to the ξ−quantile of the distribution of costs.
The scenario-specific variable v ω in constraint (3.23) defines the difference between
realized total losses for the firm and the threshold loss level η when the former exceeds
the latter. Hence, higher v ω values imply the occurrence of higher losses, which a firm
- based on risk attitude - may prefer to avoid in the expense of increased expected
losses. To this end, weight parameter λ in the objective function (3.22) is a risk
attitude indicator for the firm. A larger λ value implies a more risk-averse attitude,
while a smaller λ would imply a more risk seeking approach. As part of our policy
analyses, we consider different risk attitudes and discuss how optimal investment
insights vary under such cases.
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3.3

Policy Analysis based on Practical Data

In this section we implement our information security investment models according
to generic data obtained from partner organizations. Additional information gathered
from the literature is also used to identify general policy results for potential adoption
by firms in different industries.

3.3.1

Description of Data

We perform an online survey to information security practitioners in member firms
of the Advanced Cyber Security Center of the New England area in the United States.
The survey is aimed towards identifying key input parameters of our information
security investment model, including maximum attainable effectiveness levels of the
security controls, attack frequencies, potential total loss of breaches and expected cost
of perfect protection on the assets.
The survey contains 19 questions which clearly articulate the purpose of the survey. To ensure the respondents provide truthful feedback without concerning leakage
of private information, the survey is send out completely anonymously. Response
are collected from 8 information security management/executive practitioners and 6
information security technician/engineers. 3.1.
The types of assets, attacks, and countermeasures under each category were listed
as shown in Table 3.1. A complete presentation of the input structure used in the
analyses is shown in Table 4.1, with a brief description of the sources from which the
data is derived. No specific bounds representing the effect of regulations were used
in the implementations, as currently there are no such enforced general requirements
on firms.
The interdependency of specific countermeasure options can be evaluated based on
expert opinions and experience in practice, by comparing performances of protection
under controlled conditions. In our model, since the countermeasures are presented
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Table 3.1: Typical categorization of attacks, assets and countermeasures for information security investments
Attacks
Basic attacks:
Keyloggers and spyware
Backdoor or command control
Unauthorized access via weak access control lists
Unauthorized access via stolen credentials
Physical theft of assets
Brutal force attack
Advanced attacks:
Abuse of system access/privileges
Violation of acceptable use and other policies
Phishing
Packet sniffer
Pretexting
Assets
Non-confidential assets:
Point of sale server
Network devices
Database server
End-user system
Mobile devices
Confidential assets:
Customer personal information
Payment card information
Off-line data
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Countermeasures
Detective countermeasures:
Anti-virus software
Anti-spyware software
Content monitoring
Forensic tools
Intrusion detection system software
Log management software
Preventive countermeasures:
Biometrics
Data loss prevention
Encryption
Firewall
Intrusion prevention system
Public key infrastructure
Server-based access control list
Static account logins/passwords
Specialized wireless security
Smart cards and other one-time tokens
Virtualization-specific tools
Vulnerability/patch management
Virtual private network
Staff training programs

Table 3.2: Description of data used to represent parameters of the decision framework
Notation
maxt {β11 }

Value Used
0.5091a

maxt {β12 }

0.5788

maxt {β21 }

0.7646

maxt {β22 }

0.5277

l11 + l12 b

$205

l21 + l22

$236

α1

2.0098 × 10−10

α2

3.1230 × 10−10

θ1

5.526
10−2 P T Lc
6.404
10−2 P T L

θ2

a

×
×

Description
Maximum effectiveness of detective countermeasures on basic attacks
Maximum effectiveness of detective countermeasures on advanced attacks
Maximum effectiveness of preventive countermeasures on basic attacks
Maximum effectiveness of preventive countermeasures on advanced attacks
Expected loss in both asset categories caused
by a basic attack
Expected loss in both asset categories caused
by an advanced attack
Cost effectiveness parameter for achieving
maximum protection for preventive countermeasures
Cost effectiveness parameter for achieving
maximum protection for detective countermeasures
Investment threshold for observing life cycle
curve trend for preventive countermeasures
Investment threshold for observing life cycle
curve trend for detective countermeasures

Data Source
Survey data
Survey data
Survey data
Survey data
Ponemon (2016b)
Ponemon (2016b)
Survey data

Survey data

Survey data
Survey data

βoa values vary over time, and only the mean value is shown in the table.

b

l11 + l12 and l21 + l22 add up to a constant respectively, but the ratio f1t /f2t varies across different
industries. For the ten major industries such ratios are presented in Table 3.6.
c

All monetary values are defined as a multiple of potential total loss, which is denoted by P T L in this
table.
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Table 3.3: Stochastic scenarios of life-cycle and effectiveness realizations.
Scenario Name
HL
LL
HS
LS
MM

High effectiveness and long life-cycle for both controls.
High effectiveness and long life-cycle for both controls.
Low effectiveness and long life-cycle for both controls.
High effectiveness and short life-cycle for both controls.
Low effectiveness and short life-cycle for both controls.
Medium effectiveness and medium life-cycle for both controls.

in an aggregated fashion, it is required that the interdependency also be assessed
at the category level. To that end, we note that there exist some countermeasures
of the preventive category having a related counterpart in the detective category,
and vice versa. These countermeasures, such as firewall and anti-virus software or
intrusion prevention systems and intrusion detection systems, are aimed at providing similar protections by complementing each other through adaptation of different
strategies. Therefore, the interdependency of countermeasures on the category-level
can be measured by the portion of adoption of types of countermeasures with the
above features. Our survey of the partner organization suggests a portion of total
protection is credited to synergy effects of such countermeasures, which corresponds
to a value of ρ12 = ρ21 = 0.32. We specifically consider this value in our analyses in the
following sections, but also perform sensitivity analysis around this interdependence
measure by considering the impact of different values of ρ12 .
In addition, the countermeasure effectiveness life cycle curves are created as described in Section 3.2.2 based on the illustration in Figure 3.6b. The span of the
life cycle curves are estimated according to product release dates and end-of-service
dates derived from the technical support information of different countermeasure
types (McAfee, 2013, Symantec, 2014). While the stochastic scenarios consider two
aspects of effectiveness and life-cycle length (indicating maturity level), for computational tractability, we propose the following five scenarios described in Table 3.3.
In the above description, high effectiveness is defined as one standard deviation
above the mean, low effectiveness is one standard deviation below the mean, and
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Table 3.4: Probability distributions of security controls’ effectiveness.
Type of β
β11 : Detective control to advanced attack
β12 : Detective control to basic attack
β21 : Preventive control to advanced attack
β22 : Preventive control to basic attack

Mean
0.579
0.509
0.527
0.765

Standard deviation
0.252
0.309
0.223
0.194

Table 3.5: Probability distribution of five scenarios in maturity and effectiveness of
security controls after the initial investment period.
Scenario
Probability

HL
0.0531

LL
0.2407

HS
0.0531

LS
0.2407

MM
0.4124

medium effectiveness being around the mean. The categories of life-cycle length are
defined following similar manner, with long life-cycle being one standard deviation
above the mean, short life-cycle being one standard deviation below the mean, and
medium effectiveness being around the mean. The effectiveness of two countermeasures are assumed to be following normal distributions which fit into the survey
sample, with the parameters provided in the following Table 3.4:
The probability of each of the five scenarios can then be calculated as joint probability of the effectiveness and life-cycle realizations defined accordingly. These probability values are displayed in Table 3.5 after normalization.

Table 3.6: Frequency of basic attacks over all attacks based on Verizon (2016).
Industry category
Category I

Category II

Category III

Industry name
Hospitality
Retail
Entertainment
Manufacturing
Healthcare
Education
Information technology
Public sector
Professional service
Financial service
Average value across industries
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f2t
f1t +f2t

0.9751
0.7843
0.7500
0.7178
0.6850
0.6683
0.6176
0.5909
0.5446
0.4559
0.6478

In Table 3.6 we list the ratio of advanced attacks over all attacks targeting information systems for the different industries considered. For analysis purposes, the
industries are grouped into three major categories according to the similarity of the
corresponding advanced attack ratios. For each industry category, one frequency ratio value is adopted to represent all the industries in that category. We utilize this
setup, and obtain several practical insights for firms in each category as described in
the following subsections.

3.3.2

Analysis I: Optimal Investment in Information Systems Security

Determining the total information security budget is an important decision, as
defined through our first key operational question of how much the firm should invest
in information security. As has been emphasized by Hoo (2000), Gordon and Loeb
(2002) and Huang et al. (2008), the total required investment needs to be sufficiently
discussed and demonstrated before being put into the information security endeavor.
The results in this section are aimed at helping information security practitioners
justify their budget requirements as well as enhancing the efficiency of budget utilization for information systems security. We specifically seek answers to the following
questions: Given the type of attacks that a firm faces, as well as the potential losses
due to these attacks, what should be the optimal level of information security investment by the firm? Furthermore, does this investment level change based on the risk
attitude of the firm?
Clearly, the answers to these questions are expected to vary based on the asset and
attack mix in the information security environment that a firm operates under. These
conditions differ according to the industry and the size of the firm. However, we first
show that the mix of assets does not play a role in the optimal level of investment in
information security, and that only the total value of the assets is important. This is
described through Proposition 3.3 as follows:
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Figure 3.8: Budget size for information security investments
(a) Change in expected costs as a function of information security budget for
different industry categories.

(b) Optimal budget size as a function of
the estimated cost of perfect protection.
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Proposition 3.3 Optimal level of investment in information systems security is independent of the mix of information assets that the firm holds.
Based on this result, we investigate how the optimal investment level would vary
as a function of the total value of assets for different types of firms. In our analysis,
the optimal investment level is represented as a percentage of the total value of the
information assets that the firm holds. In Figure 3.8a we use a generic representation under a risk neutral assumption and demonstrate our findings for the major
industries we consider in this study. The horizontal axis in the plot is investment
in information systems security, and the vertical axis shows the value of expected
total costs after investments. Given that the specific optimal investment levels are
dependent on the value of the information assets of the firm, in the figure we only display the relative trend of the relationship with actual absolute values omitted. This
provides an illustration of the general pattern observed for the relationship between
information security investment and total costs, which holds for all asset configurations. In the figure, each industry category is represented by a separate curve, where
there always exists a leveling point when increasing the investment will no longer
yield a decrease in expected total costs. In other words, any investment beyond that
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level is not cost-effective. We refer to the budget size at this leveling point as the
optimal level of investment in information systems security. According to the figure,
the leveling points for Category I, II, and III industries appear at almost the same
position, indicating a universal optimal budget level for all industries with different
advanced/basic attack ratios. The expected total cost, on the other hand, presents
an increasing trend as the percentages of advanced attack get higher, which is due
to the higher expected loss value of an advanced attack. Hence, while firms in different industries generally has the same optimal budget level on investments, firms in
Hospitality and Retail are expected to cost more on information system security than
firms from other industries.
As we noted above, Figure 3.8a is a generic representation, as the specific dollar
value for the optimal investment level is a function of asset values and countermeasure costs. To that end, we express the optimal investment level for a given firm as
a function of the estimated cost of perfect asset protection for that firm, which was
discussed as part of the decision process depicted in Figure 3.2. The term ‘perfect
protection’ in this context implies that a very high percentage of the maximum possible total loss is avoided. In our analyses, such percentage value is taken to be 99.9%
and is controlled by adjusting the parameter αo , which is the indicator of the cost
effectiveness in achieving the maximum effectiveness level βo for countermeasure o.
In Figure 3.8b we present curves showing the optimal level of investment in information systems security as a function of ECOPP for different industry categories. This
figure serves as a reference for firms in determining their optimal information security
investment levels, where they would first define their ECOPP in terms of a multiple
of potential total losses that they can incur, and then find out where they lie in the
curve shown for the corresponding industry category. While ECOPP values are likely
to vary for each firm, as they depend on the size and value of a firm’s information
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assets, a relative ordering of industry categories can be made in terms of how costly
perfect protection would be at a general level.
According to Ponemon (2016a), the finance, energy and healthcare sectors suffer
the highest costs due to attacks on information systems while several other industries
like education, hospitality and entertainment sectors incur relatively lower costs. If
the purchase price of countermeasures is assumed to be the same for users from all
industries, the firms in finance and healthcare fields, where potential total losses
are higher, are likely to lie to the left of the horizontal axis in Figure 3.8b, where
perfect protection costs are measured as a percentage of the potential total loss. The
opposite is likely to hold for most firms in the hospitality and healthcare industries,
where potential total losses are relatively lower and thus ECOPP is higher when
defined as a multiple of potential total loss.
As shown in Figure 3.8b, the optimal investment level is not a monotone function
of ECOPP. It first increases, and then drops down after reaching a maximum. Hence,
a general observation is that if ECOPP is less than twice the potential total losses,
the higher the ECOPP for a firm, the higher the optimal investment in information
security. Also indicated in the plot, industries from Category I and II have slightly
higher optimal investment levels as the ECOPP becomes greater than three times
of potential total loss. Based on these observations, the overall information security
budgets for firms in Categories I and II should be on average 4% higher than the other
industries. In addition to identifying the current position on the corresponding curve
in Figure 3.8b and determining the optimal investment levels, a firm can also closely
follow the dynamics due to internal and external factors, and update their optimal
budget size as ECOPP varies due to such dynamics while planning over a long run.
We further note that the characterizations of optimal investment levels above is
consistent with the conclusion of Gordon and Loeb (2002) that a firm should never
invest more than 37% of the potential total loss on information security. Given our
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Figure 3.9: Initial period investment in information security as a function of the risk
measure for different industry categories.
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consideration of the several other attributes in the investment process, our analysis
provides more specific guidelines and tighter upper bounds under similar settings to
those considered by Gordon and Loeb (2002). We give a proof of this below as part
of Proposition 3.4, based on a deterministic case similar to that of Gordon and Loeb
(2002).
Proposition 3.4 If information security countermeasures and attacks are aggregated
into a single category under a deterministic setting, then the optimal investment in
information systems security by a firm should not exceed

β
e

of the potential total losses

that the firm can incur.
We also consider the impact of risk attitude on the optimal information security
investment level by studying the pattern illustrated in Figure 3.8a under different
weights of the CVaR component in the objective function of the optimization model.
Based on the results of this analysis, it is observed that the overall optimal total
investment levels do not vary under different emphasis levels on risk, and we conclude
that the optimal size of the information security budget is insensitive to risk under
the presented framework, and that only optimal budget allocations vary with risk.
Related to this, we note that the initial period investments do vary under different risk parameter settings. Given its dependence on the operational environment

52

for a firm, we display our findings separately for each industry category in Figure
3.9. As shown in the figure, while holding all other conditions equal, the initial period investments decrease as the risk weight parameter increases. This indicates that
when risk is highly emphasized, it is better to reduce the initial period investment
thus leave more leeway for the second stage where information on the effectiveness of
countermeasures becomes available. In other words, firms should utilize a gradually
increasing rate of usage for the information security budget within a given planning
period. The higher the emphasis on risk reduction, the higher this rate of increase
should be. It is also noticed that the rate of decrease in the initial investment levels
as a function of emphasis on risk reduction is faster for the Category III industries in
comparison to the other two categories. This suggests that firms in these industries,
such as public sectors, financial service and professional service should be even more
conservative in the first learning stage, leaving more budget flexibility for the potential variation in the second stage. This might be due to the fact that the security
controls are generally less effective on advanced attacks, making it especially difficult to withstand risk in these situations. In other words, the value of second stage
investment is higher in cases where a firm faces a higher rate of advanced attacks.
These observations also lead to the conclusion that the higher the emphasis on risk
reduction, the higher the value of information on information security countermeasure
effectiveness for a firm. Hence, information sharing between different organizations
would result in information security risk reduction for all parties involved.

3.3.3

Analysis II: Optimal Allocation of the Information Security Budget
over Countermeasure Categories

In this section we investigate optimal budget allocation policies for information
security investments in different industries, which are distinguished based on the type
of information environment that they operate in. Given these different environments,
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Figure 3.10: Budget allocation over information security countermeasure categories
for different industries.
(a) Percentage of investment on detective countermeasures.

(b) Budget allocation under different
risk weights.
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the general question that we try to answer in this section is: what should be the optimal allocation of budget over detective and preventive countermeasures for different
industries? Furthermore, how does this vary according to the risk attitude of a firm?
We show in Figure 3.10a the optimal allocation structure identified for different
industries identified by the ratio of basic attacks among all attacks they encounter.
The vertical axis shows the percentage of investment on detective countermeasures in
the initial investment period, and the horizontal axis corresponds to different industry
categories aligned in the order of the ratio of basic attacks over advanced attacks
faced. The reason for the consideration of the initial period investment here is that the
decision maker can always resolve the model based on a rolling horizon, and apply the
results from the first stage decisions. It can be observed that when all other conditions
are as described for the two kinds of countermeasures, the correlation between the
operational environment and the investment structure is obvious: when basic attacks
are more prevalent, the firm should invest more on detective countermeasures. For
industries where advanced attacks dominate basic attacks, the firm should allocate
more resources on preventive countermeasures. Based on this finding and considering
industry characteristics, we can specifically state that Category II firms, including
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Entertainment, Manufacturing, Healthcare, Education and Information technology in
industries, should invest about twice more in detective technologies than preventive
ones, corresponding to an approximate split of 65% versus 35%. Meanwhile, for
Category I and Category III firms the percentage of investment on detective measures
is approximately the same as the rate of basic attacks among all the attacks.
Related to this analysis, we also study how a firm’s risk attitude changes the optimal allocation of the information security budget over the preventive and detective
countermeasures. In Figure 3.10b we show the budget allocation over the two countermeasures as a function of the weight of the conditional value at risk component in the
objective function. The results imply that the ratio of investments on the two types
of countermeasures shows some declining trend for all the three categories. However,
such trend is not so significant at very high levels of risk emphasis. Hence, it can be
concluded based on the results that the budget split between two countermeasures is
not so sensitive towards the risk attitude of the firm.

3.3.4

Analysis III: Efficiency of Optimal Policies for Investing in Information Security

We have noted above that the potential total loss is a key determinant for the
optimal information security budget of a firm. A relevant question involves how much
of such potential loss can be avoided under the optimal policy. More specifically, what
is the difference between expected costs under optimization and potential total loss?
We answer this question by studying the ratio of saved-cost with respect to potential
total loss. This ratio is referred to as efficiency value of optimal policies, as higher
values of this ratio would imply relatively more ‘bang for the buck’ to be achieved
through an optimal investment policy.
In Figure 3.11a we display the ratio of saved-cost, which is the difference between
potential total loss and expected loss under optimal policy, with respect to optimal
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Figure 3.11: Efficiency value of optimal policies for information security investments
as a function of ECOPP.
(a) Efficiency value of optimal policies
for different industry categories under a
risk neutral setting.

(b) Efficiency value of optimal policies
for Category II industries under different
risk attitudes.
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costs. The efficiency value measures are displayed as a function of ECOPP for different
industry categories under a risk neutral setting, where the ECOPP values are defined
as multiples of potential total loss. As shown in the figure, ratio of ECOPP and
optimal cost does not follow a linear trend, and rather appears to decrease in a
convex manner. For some general insights, we note that when ECOPP approaches
zero, the saved-cost is almost the same as potential total loss, while when ECOPP
is seven times the potential total losses the saved-cost drops to zero. This implies
that optimal policies provide more efficiency especially when ECOPP is small with
respect to potential total losses. In addition, we observe that the efficiency values of
optimal policies presents a slightly decreasing order for Category III, Category II and
Category I industries, respectively.
ECOPP in most cases is relatively small for large firms in comparison to potential
total losses, as for these firms the losses caused by attacks on their information systems
are likely to be very large. A recent example is the Target breach which resulted in
costs of more than $1 billion for the company (Vomhof, 2013). On the other hand, a
smaller firm is likely to have lower potential total loss values resulting in high ECOPP
values in terms of potential total loss. Hence, large-sized firms are likely to lie on the
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left side of Figure 3.11a, while smaller firms would be more on the right side. Thus, it
can be concluded that the optimal policies are relatively of more value for larger firms
than smaller firms. However, for small-sized firms, if the potential losses decrease or
ECOPP increases due to complexity and frequency of attacks, the increase in the
efficiency value of optimal policies will be almost exponential.
As a second analysis on this issue, we also consider how risk attitude impacts
the efficiency value of optimal policies in information security investments by a firm.
In Figure 3.11b we take Category II industries as an example and display the same
information shown in Figure 3.11a under risk averse and risk seeking objectives. While
the shape of the curve appears to be relatively independent of risk attitude of the
firm, we do observe that as the firm’s risk attitude is shifting towards being more risk
seeking, the value of optimal policies becomes even higher.

3.3.5

Analysis IV: Sensitivity Around the Interdependence Measure and
Attack Frequency

Sensitivity Around the Interdependence Measure. In this section we study
the impact of the dependency parameter between the two categories of countermeasures in our framework. The standard ρ12 value in our numerical implementations is
taken as 0.45 based on estimates obtained through survey results. In the following
analysis we vary this value from 0 to 0.45, and observe the changes in the initial
period investment levels provided by the corresponding optimal solutions. The goal
of this analysis, which is performed for different industry categories in order to obtain
industry-specific features, is to assess the impact of ρoo0 on the optimal investment
policy.
As shown in Figure 3.12a, the initial period total investment levels vary as a function of the ρ value differently for each industry category. For industries in Category
III, the curve follows a slight increasing trend as the dependency parameter increases
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Figure 3.12: Analysis with varying dependency parameter ρ.
(b) Expected total costs under different
values of dependency parameter ρ.

(a) Initial period investments under different values of dependency parameter
ρ.
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from zero to the estimated value of 0.45. As for the other industries, however, this
behavior is reversed. While this is the case, we also note that the differences in the
investment levels are not very large. The gap between the highest and lowest investment levels in Figure 3.12a is less than 6% of the budget. We also consider the total
costs under different dependency measure values, and find that the total costs under
each case vary less than 1%, which is indicated through Figure 3.12b. In the figure,
as expected, the total costs monotonically drop with an increasing ρ12 value. Hence,
it can be concluded that consideration of dependency between different categories of
countermeasures has a visible, but somewhat small effect in an investment optimization framework. This also implies that our results should hold even if our estimation
of the dependency measure is not perfectly accurate, as the conclusions do not appear
to be sensitive to small deviations in the value of the dependency measure used in
the analysis.
Sensitivity Around the Attack Frequency. In the previous analyses it has
been assumed that the frequency of attacks on information systems per time unit is
a fixed value over the entire planning horizon. In this section we further consider
the cases of varying attack frequencies over time and observe the impact on initial
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Figure 3.13: Analysis with different attack frequency trends on information systems.
(b) Expected total costs under different
attack frequency trends.

(a) Initial period investments under different attack frequency trends.
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period investment levels. Specifically, we examine the first stage investments where
the annual increasing rate of attacks ranges from -15% to 15%. The comparative
analysis was performed by assuming that the total number of attacks remain the
same in each case, but the realizations of attacks are such that they either decrease
or increase in a linear fashion over a given budget period.
The dilemma that a decision maker may have under changing attack frequencies
is how much to invest in the early stages. Under the increasing trend of attack
frequencies, the intuition suggests that investing more in the early stage is also likely
to provide coverage for more intense attacks in the future. While under the decreasing
trend of attack frequencies, investing more in the initial periods might seem somewhat
counter effective as early stage installations of some countermeasures may not be as
valuable in the later stage when the attack frequency drops.
However, the analysis shows quite opposite strategies to the intuitions above. In
Figure 3.13a we show that as the frequency trend is shifting from increasing to decreasing, the investment levels in the initial periods become higher for all industries.
The seemingly counter-intuitive results are actually related to the stochastic structure in the problem framework. Under the increasing trend of attack frequency, the
uncertainty in potential loss is also larger in the later stages. Thus, investing less in
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the initial periods leaves more leeway for the second stage to cope with higher loss
realizations. As for the decreasing attack frequency trend, investing more in the initial periods means more resources can be utilized when the attacks are more intense
and the assets are at higher risk. Although some of the countermeasures invested in
the initial periods may have less value when attacks fade out, it is more essential to
have the initial periods covered well with the current setting. In addition, we also
observe in Figure 3.13b that the expected total costs under the three different attack
frequency trends display an increasing pattern as attack frequencies decrease, though
the rate of increase in Category II and III industries are subtle. This structure is
likely due to the value of learning, such that the decreasing attack rates would imply less potential value due to learning effects in later stages of the budget period.
Hence, proper allocation of early and later stage information security investments
is especially of value in increasing attack rate scenarios, where better balancing the
tradeoffs between learning through early investments and more effectiveness through
later stage investments produces more returns.

3.4

Conclusions

The severity of attacks targeting business information systems and the challenges
in dealing with them are a major concern not only in the U.S., but also all over the
globe. As a result, how much to invest on information systems security and how to
allocate available resources over different countermeasure categories are critical issues
that need to be addressed by information security practitioners. One of the greatest
challenges in optimizing information security investments is defining a reasonable and
generally applicable metric to measure the cost effectiveness of information security
protection. Moreover, the inherent dynamic and stochastic nature of information
security environment contributes to the complexity of managing such investments. In
this study, we address these challenges and develop a comprehensive framework that
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involves the major components in information security investment management. A
stochastic optimization model is then built upon this framework that adopts highlevel categorizations and captures a generic view of the decision making process with
learning effects.
Despite the fact that available data on information security investments is scarce
and usually not as irreproachable as desired, in this study we extract and utilize the
best data available in the literature, as well as data that we obtained from our industry
collaborators. Particularly, we take into consideration of the differences in operational
environments of various industries when conducting our analyses. Risk attitude is also
explicitly included in the form of sensitivity analysis around a risk measure as part of
our efforts to derive broad references for managers. In that regard, we first identify
an optimal investment level that is most effective in achieving a desired protection
level for a firm. Next, we study the allocation of investments over information security countermeasures, where the results suggest that for industries such as finance
and energy it is better to rely more heavily on detective countermeasures. For other
industries, a more even allocation of budget over preventive and detective countermeasures is recommended. Furthermore, our analysis shows that smaller firms will
benefit more from optimizing information security investments, which also holds true
for firms facing very high costs for covering all their assets against attacks on their
information systems. We also show that our modeling of interdependency between
countermeasures is quite robust and that the findings would not be significantly impacted in case of estimation errors in the values of interdependency measures used.
Finally, we also conclude that firms should be more conservative in investments while
the attack frequency is increasing, as opposed to committing to large information
security investments early in the budgeting period.
Beyond our analyses and findings, which are based on current available data and
high-level aggregation of the information security components, we note that our work
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provides a general framework that can be extended as more precise information becomes available, such as more detailed effectiveness information on individual countermeasures, potential loss information on certain assets due to specific attacks, and
operational environment/asset configuration of other industries. Customized application of the framework to individual firms using specific firm data is also possible.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR INFORMATION SHARING IN
INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY

In this chapter we discuss the sharing of information in information system security
practice. As introduced earlier in Section 1.3, this study is aimed at providing answers
to the following practical research questions: What is the optimal level of information
sharing for a firm as a function of the firm’s technology investments? What is the
value of information sharing in information security? How do these findings vary over
different operating environments?. To this end, we re-model the information system
security problem by integrating information sharing with technology investment, and
conduct analytical and numerical studies for policy analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 we introduce
the general structure of the information sharing problem under the context of information system security. In Section 4.3, we present a stochastic programming model
for information system security investment management with information sharing.
Detailed policy analysis using analytical and numerical approaches are presented in
Sections 4.2 and 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5 we summarize our results and present
the conclusions.

4.1

A Framework for Information Sharing in Information
System Security

Information sharing within the context of information system security has seldom
been modeled through an optimization based approach. This is mainly due to the
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challenges involving (i) the quantification of information sharing levels; (ii) the characterization of the regulatory drive for sharing information; (iii) the modeling of the
cost and return structures; and (iv) the modeling of the role of technology investments
in this context. In this section, we introduce the framework for information sharing
by explaining how these key aspects of the modeling characteristics are captured in
our model.

4.1.1

Quantification of Information Sharing Level

There is a variety of information that can be shared by firms to exchange knowledge on information security practice (Gordon et al., 2003, Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005,
Weiss, 2015). In general, the information being shared includes: (1) breach information on cyber-attacks, and whether these attacks are successful or not, (2) vulnerabilities in information security countermeasures, (3) methods used to defend against
cyber-attacks to protect a company’s assets, and (4) methods to minimize the economic impact of a security breach once it has been detected. As all these types of
information are gathered in different formats and transferred via different channels,
it is difficult to quantify the amount of information being shared in absolute terms.
In order to resolve this issue, several studies in the literature have adopted a quantification method for information sharing by scaling the sharing level to a fractional
value between 0 and 1.
From a practical perspective, we assume that information security experts of a
firm would standardize all the information that is being collected by their firm, and
a decision will be made to decide what portion of such information that is going
to be shared with other firms. Moreover, as various types of information can serve
distinct purposes with different levels of importance, this assumption also implies
that different kinds of information can be assigned different weights according to
their relative significance. In the remainder of this study, we assume the collection
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and weighing of information is already done by the firm, and information sharing
level is denoted by i ∈ [0, 1], where i = 0 means the firm does not participate in any
information sharing, and i = 1 means the firm is willing to share complete information
with other firms.

4.1.2

Information Sharing under a Centralized Coordinator

Despite the potential benefits of information sharing in the cybersecurity practice,
spontaneous and voluntary sharing of information does not typically happen among
firms. As analyzed in the game-theoretical studies of Gordon et al. (2003), GalOr and Ghose (2005), and Hausken (2007), when the firms act independently, the
situation eventually leads to a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium where no information is
shared among the firms. There are also several realistic concerns of the firms that
prevent their participation in information sharing, such as protecting the privacy
of the business, losing competitiveness in the industry, and the potential for being
taken advantage of by free-riders. However, studies point out that when a centralized
coordinator exists and manages the information sharing of the firms, both the social
welfare and firms’ returns are likely to be maximized. To this end, we assume in this
study that the firms are managed under the control of a central coordinator.
In practice, information sharing alliances act as a central coordinator, where their
roles include gathering of information on vulnerability and threats, providing two-way
information sharing among firms, managing rapid response communications between
firms in the event of an attack, and conducting education and training programs.
In addition, the responsibilities of the central coordinator also includes monitoring
and balancing the information sharing levels of each firm to ensure fairness. In other
words, each firm participating in an ISAC is required to share information no less than
a common minimum level, which can be decided based on negotiation and mutual
agreement.
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Building upon the discussion above, we propose a structural setup for security
information sharing that is aimed to reflect the practical environment in the current
practice. In this setup, a firm that joins a member-based information sharing alliance agrees on a desired information sharing level i∗ with other member firms. The
firm then gives out the corresponding portion of collected information to the central
coordinator, and then obtains the same level of shared information i∗ collected and
synthesized from other firms. This setup ensures that the firm would always receive
the same level of shared information as its own information sharing level.

4.1.3

Modeling the Cost of Information Sharing

Another challenge in modeling information sharing in cybersecurity is the definition and calculation of related costs. While many industries have well-developed
metrics for technology investment costs and returns, such metrics do not exist for
information sharing. As a result, it is difficult for information system security practitioners to come up with a monetary value for specific information sharing levels,
which further impedes the firms’ participation in information sharing activities. To
overcome this challenge, in this study we describe a cost modeling process that we
use in developing a cost function as part of our framework.
As mentioned in the legislative documents and literature (Gordon et al., 2003,
Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005, Weiss, 2015), the cost of security information sharing has
two main aspects. The first aspect deals with the routine costs of data collection
and administrative interactions with the information sharing alliance. The second
aspect is related to the risk of information leakage to hackers, which may increase the
likelihood of customized cyber attacks towards the firm. We refer to these two types
of costs as direct and indirect costs of information sharing, respectively. In addition,
many firms are also concerned that sharing security related information may weaken
their competitiveness in business. However, we note that the sharing of information is
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conducted anonymously under the management of a centralized coordinator, ensuring
a layer of protection on any confidential information. Such protection mechanism
is also required by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which serves as a
legislative support for the firms. Overall, the concern for losing competitiveness may
hinder a firm’s incentives for sharing information, but it typically does not constitute
a practical problem when a centralized coordinator is involved.
Concepts related to the direct cost of information sharing has been discussed in
several studies, specifically as it applies to business information disclosure (Edmans
et al., 2013, Elliott, 1994). It is explicitly stated in these studies that the cost of sharing information is positively correlated with the level of information being disclosed.
For the cost of information sharing in information system security, empirical studies
have suggested a linear cost function with a fixed rate per unit of shared information
(Berg et al., 2013). It can also be interpreted intuitively that the total workload
of information sharing is proportional to the quantity of information being shared,
resulting in a linear relationship between the direct costs and the information sharing
level. To this end, we define κd i as the total direct cost of sharing information at a
level i, where κd is the unit cost. The parameter κd can be assessed by considering
the required workload for information collection and the hourly rates of personnel
involved.
The indirect costs of information sharing, on the other hand, need to be assessed
based on expert opinions. These costs can be measured by the expected value of
losses due to an advanced attack resulting from any potentially leaked information.
While the cost of a customized attack due to information leakage can be estimated
as a fixed value based on the content of the shared information, the likelihood of information leakage is positively related to the level of information shared. Specifically,
by assuming that each unit of shared information has the same chance of exposure
to potential attackers, it can be concluded that the likelihood of information leakage

67

is a linear function of the information sharing level, which in turn implies a similar relationship between the total indirect costs and the level of information shared.
Therefore, we denote the indirect costs of information sharing as κl i, where κl is the
unit indirect cost, which also equals to the expected losses due to information leakage
under complete information sharing, i.e. when i = 1.
Eventually, the overall cost of information sharing at level i is the summation
of direct costs κd i and indirect costs κl i. Since both cost components are linear
functions of information sharing level i, in the remainder of the discussion we no
longer distinguish between direct costs and indirect costs, but use a general cost
parameter κ = κd + κl to build our modeling framework.
4.1.4

Modeling Returns from Information Sharing

While it is typically accepted that information system security can be improved at
lower cost levels by sharing information (Weiss, 2015), the returns from information
sharing are still unclear to most practitioners, as a quantitative measure is not clearly
applicable. As part of addressing this issue, we consider approaches discussed in the
literature and some actual observations from the information sharing practice, and
propose a metric to model returns from information sharing.
Previous studies on information sharing in information system security consider
information sharing as a direct addition to a firm’s investment on information security
technologies. A simplistic method of modeling information sharing is to add a certain
level of “virtual investment” on top of the actual technology investment level. While
several studies on information sharing in information system security have adopted
this modeling structure (Gordon et al., 2003, Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005, Hausken,
2006, 2007), this simple linear relationship does not fully capture the two key effects
between a virtual investment level and the information sharing level, namely the
learning and saturation effects, which are based on observations from the practice of
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Returns from information sharing

Figure 4.1: Learning and saturation effects in information sharing

Information sharing level

information sharing in information system security. The learning effect corresponds
to the phenomenon that the firm does not benefit as much when information sharing
level is very low, but gains increase when the firms increase their mutual information
sharing level to a certain extent. The saturation effect, on the other hand, refers to
the fact that when information sharing level reaches to a certain value, there exist
diminishing marginal returns. A graphical illustration of these learning and saturation
effects is shown in Figure 4.1.
To model the learning and saturation effects in information sharing, we introduce
a return function φ(i) to define the returns from sharing information at level i. φ(i)
corresponds to the percent additive effect on a firm’s technology investments due to
sharing of information, and is defined to have the following properties: (1)

∂φ(i)
∂i

i ∈ [0, 1], (2) 0 ≤ φ(i) ≤ 1, and (3) there exists a value iz ∈ [0, 1] such that
for 0 ≤ i ≤ iz and

∂ 2 φ(i)
∂i2

≥ 0 for

∂ 2 φ(i)
∂i2

≥0

≤ 0 for iz ≤ i ≤ 1. Property (1) defines φ(i) as a non-

decreasing function, while property (2) depicts the range of the function. Property
(3) implies the learning effects by defining φ(i) as a convex increasing function until
some level iz , and then as a concave increasing function for i > iz .
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Returns from information sharing

Figure 4.2: Examples of φ(i) for different parameter z values

z=0.25, h=10

z=0.50, h=10
z=0.75, h=10
Information sharing level

Given these definitions, we adopt the logistic function representation for φ(i), such
that φ(i) =

1
.
1+e−h(i−z)

In this representation, parameter h controls the steepness of

the curve, and can be set to a value such that φ(0) is close enough to 0 and φ(1)
is close enough to 1. Parameter z is referred to as the sigmoid midpoint, and is an
indicator of the relative lengths of the learning and saturation periods on the curve.
More specifically, a smaller z value would indicate fast learning and slow saturation,
while large z values would imply the opposite. A few examples of φ(i) for different
parameter z values are shown in Figure 4.2.
As suggested by Gordon et al. (2003), the returns from information sharing for
a firm are proportional to the technology investment levels of the other firms in
an information sharing alliance. To model this effect, a scaling factor γ ∈ [0, 1] is
introduced to represent the aggregate investment level by the other firms, where the
lower bound 0 implies no technology investments by other firms, and the upper bound
1 corresponds to the case of other firms investing at least as much as the decisionmaking firm. In our study, we adopt this scaling factor to describe the “virtual
investment” through information sharing. If x is the original technology investment
level and φ(i) is the percent additive effect on technology investments for sharing
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information at level i, then this implies an additional “virtual investment” of xγφ(i)
by the firm. However, this virtual investment is reduced if the aggregated effect of
technology investments by other firms is less than that of the decision-making firm.
The factor γ defines this discount, and thus total virtual investment effect is expressed
as xγφ(i).

4.1.5

Modeling the Relationship between Technology Investments and
Information Sharing

Information sharing and technology investment have been considered as strategic
counterparts of information system security (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2005), as these two
major components intervene with each other in practice: the sharing of information
among firms has a positive impact on the technology investments, and technology
investments funds the eventual sources of the shared information. In order to capture
a holistic picture of the information system security practice, it is important that
a modeling framework includes both aspects of information sharing and technology
investment. We achieve this by integrating the information sharing component into
the technology investment model introduced in Chapter 3.
As introduced in Section 4.1.4, information sharing would generate an additive
“virtual investment” effect of on the actual technology investment on information
system security. Due to this effect, the original technology investment representation
in the problem formulation of (3.5)-(3.13) in Chapter 3 needs to be adjusted accordingly. To this end, we define a new decision variable  to represent the cumulative
investment effects, i.e. the actual investment plus the “virtual” investment effect
generated by information sharing. Based on previous discussions, we have for a given
o γo
. Since the technology investment level
countermeasure o ∈ O that o = xo + 1+ex−h(i−z)

is differentiated between countermeasure categories, we note that the information
sharing efficacy factor γ is defined separately for each countermeasure.
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The effectiveness of technology countermeasures is one of the most important
terms within the framework of the technology investment problem as described in
Chapter 3. As a function of the technology investment level x, this term is subject to
reformulation with the adjusted technology investment level . By replacing variable
x with , the effectiveness of countermeasure protection under the information sharing


context is expressed as e() = β−βe−α . The joint effectiveness of two countermeasure
categories can then be rewritten as

eoo0 (o , o0 ) = ρoo0 eo (o ) + ρoo0 eo0 (o0 ) − ρ2oo0 eo (o )eo0 (o0 ),

with parameter ρoo0 being the interdependency coefficient for two countermeasure
categories as introduced in Section 3.2.1.
In addition, the endogenous uncertainty set-up is also dependent upon the adjusted technology investment level. In Section 3.2.4, it is defined that if original
technology investment for a certain countermeasure category falls below a threshold
θ, then the exact position of the life-cycle curve will not be realized in the second phase
of planning. However, with the contribution of information sharing, such threshold is
reached easier due to the additive virtual investments, reflecting the fact that the firm
learns about the countermeasure maturity though shared knowledge and experience
by other firms. The revised formulation of the corresponding constraints is given
as the following, with M being an arbitrarily large number and σo being a binary
variable indicating whether the adjusted investment level exceeds or does not exceed
the threshold:
o ≤ θo + Mσo

;

o ≥ θo + M(σo − 1).
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4.1.6

Modeling the Total Cost of Information System Security Investments under Information Sharing

As discussed in Section 3.2.1, the total cost of information system security investments consists of two parts: the loss due to attacks and investment expenditures. The
inclusion of information sharing into the problem framework would affect both parts of
the overall cost function. Without information sharing, the actual loss due to attacks
is defined as the potential total loss discounted by the overall countermeasure effectivep
P
P P
Q
ness. Namely, we have this cost term as t∈T s∈S a∈A fat las o,o0 ∈O 1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ),
P
P P
where term t∈T s∈S a∈A fat las represents the summation of potential total losses
over all assets s ∈ S caused by all types of attacks a ∈ A, over the planning period
t ∈ T . The overall countermeasure effectiveness is expressed as the product of the
p
Q
joint terms, namely as o,o0 ∈O 1 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ).
Based on the reformulation of joint effectiveness, the formulation of actual loss
would utilize the adjusted investment levels o as opposed to the original technology
p
Q
P P
investment levels xo , such that it becomes s∈S a∈A fat las o,o0 ∈O 1 − eoo0 a (o , o0 ).
With the inclusion of information sharing, eoo0 a (o , o0 ) implies a stronger countermeasure effectiveness, hence further reducing the actual losses in comparison with the
original model without information sharing. On the other hand, the investment expenditure must also include the cost of information sharing κi, indicating an increase
in the overall cost of information system security. The complete formulation for the
total cost of information system security investments under information sharing can
then be expressed as:

XX
s∈S a∈A

fat las

!
X
Y p
1 − eoo0 a (o , o0 ) +
xo + κi
o,o0 ∈O

o∈O
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(4.1)

4.2

Optimal Information Sharing under Fixed Technology
Investment

Before we develop a comprehensive numerical optimization model, in this section
we perform some structural analyses for security information sharing. For tractability
of our analysis in this section, we apply some reasonable simplifications to the original
modeling framework. The modifications assume a deterministic situation where a firm
wants to participate in information sharing with its technology investment level being
fixed beforehand, and where countermeasure categories are aggregated into a single
category.
In information system security practice, it is not unusual that information sharing
is planned and administered after technology investment is made. In many cases, the
management of a firm might consider information sharing as a secondary priority,
and can make the decision on how much information to share separately from the
technology investment decisions. Therefore, the findings in this section can provide
insightful guidance to practitioners who may decide on information sharing after
already having decided on technology investments.
As noted above, we consider a model where technology investment level x is fixed
and information sharing level i is treated as the sole decision variable. Under this
setting, the objective function is expressed as follows:

min
i∈[0,1];x∈[0,B]

XX

fat las −

a∈A s∈S

XXX

fat las (β − βe

−α(x+

γx
)
1+e−h(i−z)

) + x + κi (4.2)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

We start by a convexity analysis of the cost function (4.2) through the following:
ln

Lemma 4.1 The cost function(4.2) is convex in i for i ∈ [0, z −
ln

and concave in i for i ∈ [z −

q

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

, 1].

Proof Proof. All proofs are included in Appendix B. 
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q

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h



]

This result allows us to determine the following conclusion on as to when it is
beneficial for a firm to share information with other firms. An intuitive thought is
that firms can avoid sharing information if the marginal cost of sharing information
is very high. To this end, we have the following result:
Theorem4.1
Let i∗ be the
solution to the first order condition of function (4.2). If

q
ln

∗

i ≥ z−

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h
P

a∈A

P

s∈S

, then for a fixed technology investment
level x, there exists
!
P

a threshold κ̄ =

t∈T

−α(x+

fat las βe−αx 1−e

γx
)
∗
1+e−h(i −z)

, such that if κ ≥ κ̄, the

i∗

firm is better off by not sharing any information at all.
Theorem 4.1 specifies that sometimes the firm is better off by not participating
in information sharing if their information system security situation meets certain
conditions. Due to the complexity of cost function (4.2), the closed form solution for
this marginal cost threshold κ̄ cannot be derived analytically, but has to be obtained
numerically according to the parameter setup for the cost function. However, we
are able to derive an upper bound for κ̄ which can be applied as a quick screening
condition. This upper bound is given through Corollary 4.1 as follows:
Corollary 4.1 If marginal information sharing
cost κ is such
that





κ ≥

γx





 −αx+ r α2 γ 2 x2
q
αγx
P
P
+1+ 2
1+
α2 γ 2 x 2
αγx
4
f
l
αγxh
+1+
e
at
as
a∈A
s∈S
4
2
 q
2
,
2
2
2
1+ α γ4 x +1+ αγx
2

then the firm should

not share any information.
As introduced in Section 4.1.3, information sharing costs include both direct operational costs and indirect costs due to potential information leakage. We note that
while the direct cost of routine information sharing activities tend to be manageable,
the indirect costs of potential information leakage could be quite high for a firm, resulting in the marginal cost κ of information sharing exceeding the allowable threshold
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κ̄. Given that situation, a firm should either decrease the expected cost of information leakage by reinforcing its privacy protection methods or by not participating in
information sharing to avoid any potential losses.
As the last set of analysis in this section, we study how optimal information sharing
level reacts to changes in the marginal cost of information sharing. The finding is
given through the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 For κ < κ̄, the optimal information sharing level i∗ decreases as
marginal information sharing cost κ increases.
This result in Proposition 4.1 implies that the firms are encouraged to share
more information if the marginal cost of information sharing is lower, given that
such marginal cost is already below the limiting threshold κ̄. While confirming the
intuition of many practitioners about information sharing, it can be interpreted that
when information sharing becomes expensive, the returns that a firm would receive
from sharing a high level of information cannot offset the extra costs. This finding
would serve as a motivation for firms to collaborate and reinforce better protection
mechanisms on information, so that the marginal cost of information sharing can stay
within a reasonable range.
While analytical results in this section provide some high-level managerial insights
for information security practice, we note that there exist more complex situations
in information system security, specifically when the technology investment level and
information sharing level are both treated as decision variables. In those situations,
the simplifications made in the analytical analyses in this section will no longer apply. Therefore, we introduce a stochastic optimization model and conduct numerical
analyses accordingly. The results from analytical and numerical analyses together
are aimed to provide a comprehensive view as how to manage integrated information
sharing with technology investment in information security.
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4.3

Two-stage Stochastic Model of Information System Security Investment under Information Sharing

In this section, we formally present the stochastic model formulation for information system security investments under information sharing. The two-stage stochastic
modeling structure is adopted from the general modeling framework in Chapter 3, by
including the new information sharing related constraints discussed in this chapter.
The complete formulation of the two-stage stochastic model of information system
security investment with information sharing is given as follows:
"
Minimize

X

pω

ω∈Ω

XXXX

fat last

!
Y q
kω kω
1 − ekω
oo0 at (o , o0 )
o,o0 ∈O

k∈K s∈S a∈A t∈T

#
+

XX

xkω
o +

k∈K o∈O

X

κikω

(4.3)

k∈K

γ

kω
Subject to kω
o = xo (1 +

1+

e−h(ikω −z)

)

(4.4)

∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

kω kω
kω kω
kω
kω
2
kω kω kω
kω
ekω
oo0 at (o , o0 ) = ρoo0 eoat (o ) + ρoo0 eo0 at (o0 ) − ρoo0 eoat (o )eo0 at (o0 )
(4.5)
∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A,t∈T ,k∈K,ω∈Ω
1 1ω

1ω
−αo o
e1ω
oat (o ) = βoat − βoat e

∀o∈O,a∈A,t∈T 1 ,ω∈Ω

2 2ω

2ω
ω
ω
−αo o
e2ω
oat (o ) = boat − boat e

∀o∈O,a∈A,t∈T 2 ,ω∈Ω

1ω
, 1ω
o ≤ θo + Mσo
o ≥ θo + M(σo − 1)
XX
X

xkω
κ ikω ≤ B
∀ω∈Ω
o +
k∈K o∈O

(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)

k∈K

i1ω = i1ω

0

∀ω,ω 0 ∈Ω,o∈O

(4.10)

∀k∈K,ω∈Ω

(4.11)

0 ≤ ikω ≤ 1
(3.9),

∀o∈O,ω∈Ω

(4.6)

(3.13),

The objective of the proposed two-stage stochastic model above is to minimize
the expected overall cost of information system security, which includes the expected
losses due to attacks, as well as expenditure on technology investment and information
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sharing. The loss term
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k∈K

P

s∈S

P

a∈A
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fat last

Q

o,o0 ∈O


p
kω , kω )
1 − ekω
(
0
0
oo at o
o

is based on the discussion in Section 4.1.6, with the summation of losses over the
decision stages k ∈ K and time periods t ∈ T . The expenditure terms of technology
and information sharing investment are also calculated over the decision stages by
summing them over decision stages k ∈ K. The notation pω indicates the probability
of scenario ω ∈ Ω, where the definition of the scenarios is based on the life-cycle
status of the countermeasures in the second stage. In the two-stage stochastic setting,
the second stage total cost is dependent on the scenario realization, and hence the
objective is defined as an expectation over the scenario probabilities..
As introduced in Section 4.1.5, constraint (4.4) defines the “virtual investment”
generated by information sharing for each technology countermeasure o ∈ O. Constraint (4.5) is the joint effectiveness of countermeasures with adjusted technology investment levels, which is defined over all possible countermeasure pairs o, o0 ∈ O. Note
that the joint effectiveness of countermeasures is expressed as a function of individual
countermeasure effectiveness, which is given by constraints (4.6) - (4.7). Variable bωoat
in constraint (4.7) has the same meaning as introduced in Chapter 3, which is the
realized value of maximum attainable effectiveness of countermeasure o ∈ O against
attack a ∈ A at each time period in the second stage. Constraint (4.8) defines the
threshold θo in technology investment level of the countermeasure. Constraint (4.9)
is the budget constraint, which limits the total expenditure of technology investment
and information sharing within budget B for every scenario ω ∈ Ω. Constraint (4.10)
is the non-anticipativity constraints for the two-stage stochastic model. Similar to
the definition of constraint (3.13), which is introduced in Chapter 3, constraint (4.10)
fixes the information sharing level to be the same value in every scenario in the first
stage, and allows the optimal information sharing level to vary in the second stage
as technology investment levels change according to different life-cycle development
realizations.
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4.3.1

Solution Methodology

The information system security investment model under information sharing as
introduced above is a non-convex nonlinear optimization problem as the cost function contains complex products of multiple decision variables with some non-linear
constraints. In this section, we improve the computational tractability by reformulating the model through a series of steps that involve piecewise linearization including
bilinear terms.
First, we note that the non-linear terms in (4.3), (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7) can
be approximated using piece-wise linearization similar to the discussion by Section
kω
kω
kω kω
kω
3.2.5. To start, we define new variables Eoo
0 at (o , o0 ) and Ioo0 at (o ) such that

kω
kω kω
kω
kω kω
kω
kω
kω kω
Eoo
and Ioo
0 at (o , o0 ) = ln 1 − eoo0 at (o , o0 )
0 at (o ) = ln(1 − ρoo0 eoat (o )). Con-

straint (4.5) can then be expressed in a simple linear form as:

kω
kω kω
kω
kω
kω
kω
Eoo
0 at (o , o0 ) = Ioo0 at (o ) + Io0 oat (o0 )

∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A,t∈T ,k∈K,ω∈Ω

(4.12)

kω
kω
The new variable Ioo
0 at (o ) can be approximated in a piecewise linear fashion by a

series of M constraints. Specifically, constraint (4.6) can be viewed as a special case
kω
kω
of Ioo
0 at (o ) where k = 1 as:

1ω
1ω
1ω
1ω
1ω
Ioo
0 at,m (o ) ≥ uoo0 at,m o + voo0 at,m

∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A,t∈T 1 ,ω∈Ω,m=1,...,M

(4.13)

Following the same approach, constraint (4.7) can be replaced by the design of two
sets of switching constraints using the binary variable σo and piecewise approximation
kω
kω
of Ioo
0 at (o ) for k = 2:

2ω
2ω
2ω
2ω
2ω
Ioo
0 at,m (o ) ≥ uoo0 at,m o + voo0 at,m − Mσo

∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A,t∈T 2 ,ω∈Ω,m=1,...,M

(4.14)

2ω
2ω
2ω
2ω
2ω
Ioo
0 at,m (o ) ≥ uoo0 at,m o + voo0 at,m − M(1 − σo )

∀o,o0 ∈O,a∈A,t∈T 2 ,ω∈Ω,m=1,...,M

(4.15)
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kω
kω kω
The product term in the objective function is reformulated using Eoo
0 at (o , o0 ) as:

√ kω kω kω
Y q
Q
1−eoo0 at (o ,o0 )
kω , kω ) = eln o,o0 ∈O
1 − ekω
(
oo0 at o
o0
o,o0 ∈O
1

= e2

P

o,o0 ∈O

1

with the term e 2

ln(1−ekω
(kω ,kω
)
oo0 at o
o0 )

P

o,o0 ∈O

1

= e2

kω (kω ,xkω )
Eoo
0 at o
o0

P

o,o0 ∈O

kω (xkω ,xkω )
Eoo
0 at o
o0

(4.16)

approximated by a set of linear constraints as

follows:

Yatkω ≥ hkω
at,m

X

kω
kω kω
kω
Eoo
0 at (o , o0 ) + gat,m

∀a∈A,t∈T ,k∈K,ω∈Ω,m=1,...,M

(4.17)

o,o0 ∈O

As the next step, we transform the non-linear term in constraint (4.4) as product
of xkω
o and 1 +

1
kω
1+e−h(i −z)

to a bilinear term Xokω P kω , with new variables Xokω = xkω
o

and P kω defined as P kω = 1 +

1
.
kω
1+e−h(i −z)

The following set of constraints is then

added to the model to approximate P kω = 1 +

Plkω = τlkω ikω + υlkω

1
kω
1+e−h(i −z)

as linear terms:

∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω,l=1,...,L

(4.18)

For the linear approximation of the bilinear term Xokω P kω , we utilize a two dimensional grid where the axes correspond to the values of Xokω and P kω . Let the
upper and lower bounds of Xokω and P kω be Xokω , Xokω , P kω , and P kω , respectively.
We discretize Xokω and P kω into S and T intervals respectively to form the grid. Furkω
thermore, we introduce auxiliary variables πo,m,n
, m = 1, . . . , S, n = 1, . . . , T and two
kω
specially ordered set of type 2 (SOS2) variables µkω
o,m and νo,n . Letting the variable
kω
XPokω correspond to an approximation of the value of xkω
, we can approximate
o P

the bilinear term Xokω P kω through the following set of constraints:
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X

kω
πo,m,n
=1

(4.19)

∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

m,n


m−1
kω
(P kω + P kω − P kω
)πo,m,n
∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω
S
m,n
n−1

X
kω
)πo,m,n
Xokω =
(Xokω + Xokω − Xokω
∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω
T
m,n




X
kω
kω
kω m − 1
kω
kω n − 1
kω
kω
kω
XPo =
(P + P − P
)(Xo + Xo − Xo
)πo,m,n
S
T
m,n
X

P kω =

(4.20)
(4.21)

(4.22)

∀k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

µkω
o,m =

X

kω
πo,m,n

(4.23)

∀m,k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

n

X

kω
νo,n
=

kω
πo,m,n

(4.24)

∀n,k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

m
kω
µkω
o,m , νo,n ∈ SOS2

(4.25)

∀m,n,k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

kω
πo,m,n
≥0

(4.26)

∀m,n,k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

We refer to the set of constraints (4.19) - (4.26) as X P kω
o . After transforming the
objective function (4.3), constraints (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7) as described above,
we can express the overall convex reformulation of the information system security
investment under information sharing model as follows:

min+

X

x,i,E,I,Y∈R ,σ∈{0,1}

ω∈Ω

pω

"
XXXX

#
fat last Yatkω +

XX
k∈K o∈O

k∈K s∈S a∈A t∈T

xkω
o ++

X

κi ikω

k∈K

(4.27)
s.t. (3.9) − (3.13), (4.9) − (4.11), (4.12) − (4.18)
kω
kω
kω
P kω , Xokω , XPokω , µkω
o,m , νo,n , πo,m,n ∈ X P o

∀m,n,k∈K,o∈O,ω∈Ω

(4.28)

The above formulation is a linear stochastic integer programming model, and can be
solved directly to obtain the optimal information sharing and technology investment
levels for both stages, where the first stage solutions are of interest to a decision
maker.
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4.4

Numerical Analysis and Policy Results

In this section, we perform numerical analyses to identify some policy results
for information sharing in information security. More specifically, we numerically
study the two-stage stochastic model described in Section 4.3, where the technology
investment levels xo and information sharing level i are simultaneously considered as
decision variables. Managerial insights are provided by analyzing the problem with
real data. In the remainder of this section, we first introduce the data that we utilize
for our findings, and then present a set of policy analyses. We specifically focus on
optimal information sharing levels and value of information sharing under different
operating environments.

4.4.1

Description of Data

As part of the data gathering process, surveys were performed at a partner organization, where the proposed framework was observed from a practical perspective.
These surveys included questions aimed at identifying the distinct categorizations
of information system assets, attacks, and countermeasures. In addition to the survey data, we also utilized data obtained from the literature for our analyses. The
parameter values obtained through these means are listed in Table 4.1.
Other parameters related to information sharing are the marginal cost of information sharing, κd , indirect unit cost κl , parameters h and z in return function φ(i),
and γ, the aggregate investment level on information system security by other firms.
The direct cost information obtained through our surveys include billable work hours
of associated personnel, cost of holding business meetings with partner firm representatives and the membership fees of joining information sharing associations. For the
indirect costs due to information leakage, we adopt the published data by Ponemon
(2016b) and estimate the expected cost of an advanced cyber attack due to information leakage. A summary of these parameter values is listed in Table 4.2. For
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Table 4.1: Description of data used to represent parameters of the decision framework
Notation
maxt {β11 }

Value Used
0.5091a

maxt {β12 }

0.5788

maxt {β21 }

0.7646

maxt {β22 }

0.5277

l11 + l12

$205

l21 + l22

$236

α1

2.0098 × 10−10

α2

3.1230 × 10−10

θ1

5.526 × 10−2 P T Lb

θ2

6.404 × 10−2 P T L

a

Description
Maximum effectiveness of detective countermeasures on basic attacks
Maximum effectiveness of detective countermeasures on advanced attacks
Maximum effectiveness of preventive countermeasures on basic attacks
Maximum effectiveness of preventive countermeasures on advanced attacks
Expected loss in both asset categories caused
by a basic attack
Expected loss in both asset categories caused
by an advanced attack
Cost effectiveness parameter for achieving
maximum protection for preventive countermeasures
Cost effectiveness parameter for achieving
maximum protection for detective countermeasures
Investment threshold for observing life cycle
curve trend for preventive countermeasures
Investment threshold for observing life cycle
curve trend for detective countermeasures

Data Source
Survey data
Survey data
Survey data
Survey data
Ponemon (2016b)
Ponemon (2016b)
Survey data

Survey data

Survey data
Survey data

βoa values vary over time, and only the maximum value is shown in the table.

b
All monetary values are defined as a multiple of potential total loss, which is denoted by P T L in this
table.

Table 4.2: Summary of the parameter values related to information sharing costs,
where each value implies a multiple of potential total loss
Notation Value
κd
0.095
0.053
0.015
0.027
κl
0.175
0.75
0.24

Description and details
Direct marginal cost of information sharing
Expenses on billable work hours of related personnel
Expenses on holding business meetings
Membership fees of information sharing organization
Indirect marginal cost of information sharing
Estimated cost of cyber attack due to information
leakage
Probability of cyber attack due to information leakage
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Data source
Survey data

Ponemon
(2016b)

parameters of return function φ(i), we take the sigmoid mid-point value z to be 0.5
by assuming the learning effects and saturation effects in information sharing as being equally strong. The steepness
parameter
h is set to be h = 13.81, such that the
q

ln

point of inflection z −

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

is always between 0 and 1 under different

technology investment levels within the budget. As the aggregated investment level
of other firms varies according to different information security technology investment
environment levels, we set the initial value of γ to be 1, and then conduct a sensitivity
analysis around this value to study its impact on information sharing levels.
The first problem we study through numerical analysis is the optimal information
sharing level in information system security. While in Section 4.2 we describe some
structural properties about optimal information sharing level from a static sense, in
this section we are able to obtain the optimal information sharing level numerically
based on the stochastic model, and observe how it varies as other parameters in
information system security changes.

4.4.2

Optimal Level of Information Sharing under Different Budget Sizes

We first study how the budget level affects information sharing in information
system security. To further discuss the findings, here we introduce the concept of
most effective budget (MEB) under the information sharing context. As one of the
results in Section 3.3.2, the overall expected total costs decrease in a convex manner
as investment level increases, but converges to an asymptotical level after budget
reaches MEB. Such a leveling point also exists when information sharing is considered, where this leveling point in expected total costs corresponds to a budget that
covers both technology investment and information sharing costs. This MEB value
typically depends on the potential total losses without protection, marginal ratio αo of
investment effectiveness of technology countermeasures, and information sharing cost
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Optimal information sharing level (𝒊∗ )

Figure 4.3: Optimal information sharing level under different budget sizes

0.75

0.7

0.65

0.6

0.55
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Budget measured as percentage of most effective
budget (MEB)

κ. Ideally, a firm would set the budget size equivalent to MEB so that the maximum
extend of protection is achieved without potential waste of funds.
However, MEB may not always be achievable in practice, especially by small to
medium sized firms which may have limited information system security budgets.
In that case, technology investment and information sharing would compete for the
available budget, and how much information to share becomes a key strategic problem.
We perform numerical analyses over the budget size from 0 to the level of MEB to
observe how the optimal information sharing level varies according to different budget
sizes. The results are shown in Figure 4.3.
As can be observed in Figure 4.3, the optimal information sharing level i∗ increases
with the budget size in a non-linear manner. When the budget size is less than one
third of MEB, the optimal information sharing level i∗ stays below 0.6, and increases
rapidly as the budget grows from 30% to 40% of MEB. When the budget size is
higher than one half of MEB, the information sharing level remains at a relatively
high level. This indicates that firms with budgets above half of MEB should share
about 15% more information.

85

The fact that optimal information sharing level i∗ is never zero indicates that
under the given assumptions the firms would always benefit from information sharing
when the marginal cost of information sharing κ is below the threshold κ̄, even at
lower budget levels. Generally, firms with larger security budgets, which typically
corresponds to larger companies, should share more information to take advantage of
the virtual investment effect. For smaller to medium size companies, for which the
optimal information sharing level is lower, increasing the information system security
budget to levels near MEB would benefit the firm both in terms of technology returns
and also due to larger levels of information sharing to be performed. On the other
hand, if a firm cannot afford to increase its budget over one half of MEB, then they
may consider not participating in information sharing due to affordability issues.

4.4.3

Optimal Level of Information Sharing under Different Expected
Cost of Perfect Protection

In this section, we study the relationship between the optimal information sharing level i∗ and overall ECOPP values, as introduced in Section 3.3.2, by running
sensitivity analysis over a set of different ECOPPo values and solving for optimal
information sharing levels i∗ . As part of this analysis, the budget size for information
system security is assumed to be equal to MEB in order to eliminate the influence
of the budget constraint. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.4, where the overall
ECOPP values are measured as a multiple of the potential total losses of a firm.
As can be observed in Figure 4.4, the information sharing level first increases as
ECOPP increases, but slightly decreases from a maximum point when ECOPP is
measured as 1.5 times of potential total losses. Since ECOPP is a measure reflecting
the affordability of technology countermeasures for a firm, the drop in information
sharing level can potentially be explained by the ineffectiveness of general information
security investments due to higher costs. However, for firms that have a limited
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Optimal information sharing level

Figure 4.4: Optimal information sharing level under different ECOPP values
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budget but are more prone to information system security attacks, the ECOPP value
is likely to fall into the range between 1-1.5 times of potential total losses. Such
businesses should place more emphasis in information sharing, with potential optimal
information sharing levels being about 5% higher than those firms with ECOPP values
less than their potential total losses.

4.4.4

Value of Information Sharing

To further study the economic incentives of information sharing in information
system security investments, in this section we present two sets of analysis on the
value of information sharing. The value of information sharing is calculated as the
percentage difference between the expected total cost of information security investments with information sharing and the costs without information sharing. We first
show the value of information sharing under different budget sizes measured as multiples of MEB, and then compare the value of information sharing for firms with
different ECOPP values. It is also worthwhile noting that the information sharing
alliances often consist of companies with different technology investment levels, resulting a variety of information sharing environments for different firms. To address
this operational factor, in the latter part of the analysis we compare the value of information sharing for firms under different information sharing environments, which
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Value of information sharing as
percentage of total cost

Figure 4.5: Value of information sharing under different budget sizes
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is defined by the aggregated technology investment level of the firms that mutually
share information.

4.4.4.1

Value of Information Sharing under Different Budget Sizes

The change in the value of information sharing as a function of budget size is
shown in Figure 4.5. As shown in the figure, the value of information sharing is
always increasing as the budget size gets closer to MEB. Similar to the findings
discussed for the optimal information sharing level, the best value for information
sharing is attained at higher levels of information security investments. Therefore,
firms of large sizes or with relatively higher security budgets should be more motivated
in participating in information sharing.
In addition, the value of information sharing concavely increases as a function
of budget size, which is different from the S-shaped curve observed for the optimal
information sharing level in Figure 4.3. This result serves as another motivation for
firms to further push for higher levels of information security budgets, as return rates
increase as a function of the budget size. This is in contrast with the case in Figure
4.3, where there is not a significant need to increase the information sharing level as
long as the budget size is smaller than MEB.
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4.4.4.2

Value of Information Sharing under Different ECOPP and Investment Environments

As a final analysis, we study the impact of ECOPP on the value of information
sharing for different firms. Since ECOPP reflects the affordability of information
security technology, an increase in ECOPP would indicate a more challenging information security environment. Figure 4.6 shows the value of information sharing
under different ECOPP values. Comparing with the increasing information sharing
level i∗ as a function of ECOPP in Section 4.4.3, Figure 4.6 shows that the value of
information sharing decreases as the information security technology becomes more
expensive, which can be seen as a reflection of the declining cost-effectiveness of overall
information system security investments in tougher investment environments.
Moreover, as discussed earlier in Section 4.1.4, technology investments by other
firms in an information sharing alliance can play an important role on the value
of information sharing, as represented through the value of the parameter γ. To
further study this impact, we compare the value of information sharing as a function
of ECOPP for different levels of aggregated technology investment factor γ. This
comparison is presented in Figure 4.6 by showing the trend in value of information
sharing as a function of ECOPP for different settings of γ values.
As shown in Figure 4.6, while the value of information sharing as a function of
ECOPP follows a decreasing trend, it is obvious that aggregated technology investment factor γ of the other firms is positively correlated with the value of information
sharing, under same ECOPP levels. This result is in line with the intuition that
when the partner firms allocate more resources to information security technology
investments, the experience and knowledge they gather would be more informative.
Consequently, information shared by such firms is of more value to the other firms
who learn through their shared information. On the other hand, if all the other
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Figure 4.6: Value of information sharing under different ECOPP and investment
environments
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partner firms have lower information security technology investments, the value of
information sharing for the decision-making firm will be negatively impacted.
As a managerial insight for forming alliances for information sharing, the findings
of this analysis suggest that firms would benefit from building alliances with other
firms that have similar information security technology investment levels. In this
way, all the firms would achieve a relatively high value out of information sharing
in a fair manner without any concerns for free-riding effects. Meanwhile, small to
medium size firms might be motivated to cooperate with larger-sized firms to take
advantage of their information security technology investments scales.

4.5

Conclusion

With the need for joint efforts on information system security by all types of
firms under an increasingly challenging cyber environment, information sharing has
been encouraged by both the U.S. legislation and business practice. Therefore, how
much information to share and the value of information sharing have become key
practical questions for information security practitioners. To answer these questions,
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in this study, we design a framework which includes technology investments and information sharing as two intertwining components of information system security.
The framework also includes quantification metrics to measure information sharing
levels and corresponding returns. The dynamics of information system security investments are captured through a two-stage stochastic programming structure. We
take into consideration different operational situations and perform policy analyses
involving structural and numerical results. More specifically, we first study a simplified analytical model where technology investment level is fixed in advance of the
firm participating in information sharing. We find that there exists a threshold in
marginal cost of information sharing such that a firm is better off by not sharing any
information if the marginal cost exceeds this threshold.
Next, we study the optimization problem of minimizing total information security
costs where information sharing and technology investment decisions are made simultaneously. For the optimal level of information sharing, we show that the optimal
information sharing level increases slowly with the budget size for firms with very low
or very high budgets, but at a faster rate for budget sizes around one half of the most
effective budget. As a result, large firms with sufficient information security budgets
should typically share 15% more information when compared with small to medium
sized firms with budgets less than half of MEB. We also find that the optimal information sharing level is concavely increasing with the expected cost of perfect protection
of a firm, indicating that firms prone to cyber attacks are encouraged to participate more in information sharing. Furthermore, we examine the value of information
sharing under different operational conditions including budget sizes, expected costs
of perfect protection, and aggregate levels of technology investments by other firms.
The results show that the value of information sharing is increasing with the budget
size, and decreasing with expected cost of perfect protection. Moreover, the value of
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information sharing is highest when all firms in an information alliance have similar
levels of technology investment.
As one of the few studies on information sharing of information system security,
our work adds to the literature by providing a framework of information system security investment problems that captures both aspects of technology investment and
information sharing. While in this study we assume a fair information sharing environment under the management of a centralized coordinator, the framework can also
be extended to accommodate more complex situations where asymmetric information
sharing is unavoidable, which we do in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION SHARING IN
INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY

In this chapter we address the problems proposed by the end of Chapter 4 by
seeking answers to the following research questions: (1) What fair price should a
firm pay participating information sharing in asymmetric sharing environment? (2)
How would the price of information vary under different pricing strategies and other
influencing factors? To this end, we develop analytical expressions of a firm’s payoffs
under an asymmetric information sharing environment and analyze the pricing of
information under two distinct pricing strategies through analytical and numerical
analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.1 we introduce
two pricing strategies of asymmetric information sharing and discuss them under
three distinct settings. Policy insights based on practical data is presented in 5.1.4
through an numerical example. Finally, in Section 4.5 we summarize our results and
present the conclusions.

5.1

Pricing Strategies for Asymmetric Information Sharing
under Deterministic Setting

Our analysis of asymmetric information sharing in the information security context
considers three distinct settings. In the first case, we assume a two-firm alliance,
where only one of the firm provides security information. In the second case, both
firms share information in different levels. Finally, in the third case, we consider the
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sharing of information among multiple firms. For each of these cases, we study the
functional relationship between the level of information shared by each firm at any
price that the firm needs to pay for being part of the information sharing alliance.

5.1.1

Case I: One-way Information Sharing Between Two Firms

Consider a setup with two firms involved in an information sharing alliance. We
assume without loss of generality that Firm A provides information to Firm B , while
Firm B does not provide any information but is willing to pay a price p for the
information it receives from Firm A.
For notational simplicity, we use the generic functions (5.1)-(5.2) to represent
the information security related losses of a Firm A and Firm B under technology
investment level xA and xB without information sharing;

g(xA , 0) =

XXX

g(xB , 0) =

XXX

fat las (1 − βA + βA e−αA xA )

(5.1)

fat las (1 − βB + βB e−αB xB )

(5.2)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

a∈A s∈S t∈T

For the paying Firm B , we use function (5.3) to represent its information security
related losses under technology investment level xB when receiving shared information
at level iA from sharing Firm A.

g(xB , iA ) =

XXX

fat las (1 − βB + βB e−αB (xB +γA φA (iA )xB ) )

(5.3)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

5.1.1.1

Pricing with Fixed Technology Investment Level

An important issue regarding the payoffs for the information acquiring firm is
how technology investment is handled in accordance with the acquired information.
In practice, when information sharing is new to the firm and technology investment
level is not easily adjusted, Firm B would maintain the same technology level xB with
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or without acquiring shared information from Firm A. In this subsection, we discuss
the pricing strategy under this situation with fixed technology investment levels.
Following the modeling structure introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, the overall
information security cost of Firm A before and after sharing information can be
expressed as the following:

Bef ore : g(xA , 0) + xA

(5.4)

Af ter : g(xA , 0) + xA + κA iA − p
Dif f erence :

− κA iA + p

(5.5)
(5.6)

The overall information security cost of Firm B before and after sharing information
can be expressed as:

Bef ore : g(xB , 0) + xB

(5.7)

Af ter : g(xB , iA ) + xB + p

(5.8)

Dif f erence : g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − p

(5.9)

The benefit of information sharing is entirely reflected from the reduced information
security related costs in Firm B , which follows:

g(xB , 0)−g(xB , iA ) =

XXX



−αB (xB +γA φ(iA )xB )
−αB xB
fat las βB e
−βB e
(5.10)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

Give this, we propose a simple asymmetric information pricing strategy for this
case, which equally splits the benefits of information sharing between the two firms.
We refer to this pricing strategy as equal benefits strategy. Based on this assumption,
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the fair price peb such that the overall cost differences for Firm A (equation 5.6) and
Firm B (equation 5.9) equal to each other:

κA iA + peb =g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − peb
1
peb = (g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − κA iA )
2

(5.11)

The fair price under the equal benefits pricing strategy would make sure that
both the information sharing firm and the information acquiring firm benefit from
the practice of information sharing, which serves as a motivation for the collaboration
between the two parties. On the other hand, certain conditions have to be met
before the two firms participate in one-way information sharing relationship, which
is illustrated through the following Theorem:
Theorem 5.1 The two firms will not benefit from information sharing practice if the
marginal cost of information sharing for Firm A exceeds the following threshold κ¯A :

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

fat las βB e−αB xB

P

t∈T

κ¯A ≡

−αB (xB +

1−e

γ x
A B
)
−h(i∗ −z)
A
1+e

!
(5.12)

i∗A

where i∗A is the solution to the first order condition of function (5.11) such that
q
ln
∗

α 2 γ 2 x2
B B B
4

iA ≥ z −

+1+

αB γA xB
2



h

.Theorem 5.1 implies that Firm A’s marginal cost of information sharing should match
Firm B’s ability to generate benefits through technology investment. Specifically,
if Firm A has a high risk of information leaking or complex information sharing
protocols, it might not be cost-effective for Firm B to collaborate with Firm A in
information sharing.
96

When the marginal information sharing cost κA is lower than the above threshold
κ¯A , the sharing Firm A can potentially increase its information sharing level in return
for higher prices paid by Firm B . Firm B can also change its technology investment
level to generate more benefits using the acquired information. Details on these
relationships are given by the following proposition 5.1:
Proposition 5.1 When the marginal cost of information sharing for Firm A is lower
than the threshold given by (5.12), the fair price for one-way information sharing with
equal benefit strategy is:
(1) increasing with Firm B’s technology investment level xB on [0, x∗B ) and then de
P
P
P
ln
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βB αB (1+γA φA (iA ))
∗
∗
creasing on [xB , +∞), where xB =
;
αB (1+γA φA (iA ))
(2) highest regarding to iA when iA equals to i∗A , where i∗A is the solution to the
(0)

(0)

r
ln

first order condition of function (5.11) such that i∗A

α2 γ 2 x 2
B B B
4

≥z−

(0)

5.1.1.2

+1+
h

α

γ x
B A B
2

!

.

Pricing under Re-optimized Technology Investments

As discussed in Section 4.4.2, information acquiring firms are better off by investing according to the MEB on security technologies, which usually means different
investment levels before and after acquiring shared information. While some firms
new to the information sharing practice may not have such flexibility, most firms can
achieve this by developing advanced investment mechanisms to incorporate shared
information. In such cases, the re-optimized technology investment level will affect
the fair price value with the equal benefit strategy.
Consider a similar setup as in Section 5.1.1 but with Firm B investing x∗B before
acquiring Firm A’s information and x∗∗
afterwards. The overall information security
B
cost of Firm B before and after sharing information can be expressed as:
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Bef ore : g(x∗B , 0) + x∗B

(5.13)

Af ter : g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗∗
+p
B
B

(5.14)

Dif f erence : g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
−p
B
B

(5.15)

The overall cost of Firm A before and after sharing information remains the same
as in (5.4)-(5.6) The fair price under equal benefit strategy that sets the pay-off for
Firm A and Firm B as the same can then be expressed as:

∗

peb =


1
g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
+ κA iA
B
B
2

(5.16)

By solving for the xB values that minimizes Firm B’s overall cost, we can obtain the
fair price under equal benefit strategy when Firm B invest at the level of MEB and
re-optimizes its technology investment level after obtaining shared information. The
following theorem gives the closed-form expression for pricing strategies under this
case:
Theorem 5.2 When the paying Firm B invest according to MEB and re-optimizes
∗

its technology investments after acquiring information, the fair price peb for the information shared by Firm A is:

p

eb∗

=

1 + ln

−

P

1 + ln

a∈A

P

P

a∈A

s∈S

P

t∈T

2α
PB P
s∈S

2αB

fat las βB αB



fat las βB αB 1 + γA φ(iA )

1 + γA φ(iA )
t∈T


+

1
2κA iA

(5.17)

Comparing the pricing structure with and without re-optimization of technology investments, we can draw conclusions similar to those in Section 4.4.2. Under asymmetric information sharing, firms can get higher overall payoffs by always investing
according to MEB. This finding is summarized by the following corollary:
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Corollary 5.1 For a two firm information sharing alliance with one-way information
sharing, the pay-offs for both firms would increase if the buying Firm B re-optimizes
its technology investment level. The increase in the pay-off for each Firm amounts
to:
P

P

P

 (1+γA φ(iA )) ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βB αB )
 XXX
 − ln(P P P fat las β α 1+γ φ(i ))
1
a∈A s∈S
t∈T
B B
A
A
fat las βB αB 1 + γA φ(iA )
2 a∈A s∈S t∈T

P
P P
ln
f
l
β
α
1
at
as
B
B
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T
+
−
2αB
2αB 1 + γA φ(iA )

P
P P
ln
f
l
β
α
1
+
γ
φ(i
)
at
as
B
B
A
A
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T

(5.18)
−
2αB 1 + γA φ(iA )
5.1.2

Case II: Mutual Information Sharing between Two Firms

As a second case, we consider two firms that both share information but not
necessarily at the same sharing level. Without loss of generality, we assume Firm B
pays a positive price pB to Firm A. Firm B is referred to as “paying firm” and Firm A
is referred to as “non-paying firm”. The price paid by Firm A is therefore a negative
value pA = −pB . Similar to Section 5.1.1.1, we first assume that the firms would not
re-optimize their technology investment levels. The overall information security costs
of Firm A before and after sharing information can be expressed as:
Bef ore : g(xA , 0) + xA

(5.19)

Af ter : g(xA , iB ) + xA + κA iA − p,
Dif f erence : g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) − κA iA + p

(5.20)
(5.21)

Similarly, the overall information security costs of Firm B before and after sharing
information can be expressed as:
Bef ore : g(xB , 0) + xB

(5.22)

Af ter : g(xB , iA ) + xB + κB iB + p,

(5.23)

Dif f erence : g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − κB iB − p

(5.24)
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5.1.2.1

Pricing with Fixed Technology Investment Level

Under the equal benefit pricing strategy, the fair price that Firm B should pay to
Firm A can be calculated by setting the overall payoff of information sharing as the
same for the two firms:
g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) − κA iA + peb = g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − κB iB − peb

(5.25)

The fair prices peb = pB = −pA can be calculated as:




1
eb
g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − κB iB − g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) − κA iA
(5.26)
p =
2
While both firms are sharing information with each other and splitting their benefits
in an even manner according to the equal benefit strategy, the payoffs for a firm might
be very different from the financial contribution credited to its shared information.
Such differences in payoffs and contributions can impact the firms’ motivation for
sharing information. To this end, we propose a second pricing strategy for asymmetric
information sharing.
The second pricing strategy addresses the contribution of each firm through their
information sharing activity. We refer to this method as exchange return pricing
strategy. Under this strategy, a decision making firm’s overall payoff is equal to the
reduced costs by the other firm subtracted by the decision making firm’s information
sharing costs. The two firm’s overall payoffs are no longer equal to each other:

Firm A’s payoff = g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − κA iA

(5.27)

Firm B’s payoff = g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) − κB iB

(5.28)

Based on this, the fair price under exchanged return strategy for the previously described two firms A and B can be given as:
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pB = per = g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) − g(xA , 0) + g(xA , iB )

(5.29)

Through the payoff functions (5.27)-(5.28), it is made clear that the return generated
by the firms should cover each other’s sharing costs, or it would lead to the firm’s
payoff being negative. Moreover, two firms are simultaneously motivated to share
according to the best information sharing levels, leading to the maximum net return
of the information sharing alliance. The strategy would also encourage transparency
between the two firms regarding communication on sharing costs, technology efficacy,
and potential total costs, which are the essential contents of shared information as
discussed in Chapter 4.
While the fair price payoffs for the two firms are substantially different with equal
benefit and the exchange return polices, it is possible that the two firms eventually
reach a final price that lies in between peb and per through negotiation, which can
address fairness and contribution in a balanced way.

5.1.2.2

Pricing under Re-optimized Technology Investment Levels

In this subsection, we consider the situation where both firms invest in security
technologies according to MEB with re-optimization after mutual sharing information.
Similar to Section 5.1.1.2, the optimal technology investment levels are denoted as
x∗ before information sharing and x∗∗ after information sharing. The overall costs of
the two firms before and after information sharing are expressed as follows:
Firm A :
Bef ore : g(x∗A , 0) + x∗A

(5.30)

Af ter : g(x∗∗
, iB ) + x∗∗
+ κA iA − p,
A
A
Dif f erence : g(x∗A , 0) − g(x∗∗
, iB ) + x∗A − x∗∗
− κA iA + p
A
A

Firm B :
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(5.31)
(5.32)

Bef ore : g(x∗B , 0) + x∗B

(5.33)

Af ter : g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗∗
+ κB iB + p,
B
B

(5.34)

Dif f erence : g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
− κB iB − p
B
B

(5.35)

Based on these, the fair price with the equal benefit strategy is given as:

pB = p

eb∗

1
=
2



, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
− κB iB
g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗∗
B
B
∗

∗∗

∗


∗∗

− g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) + xA − xA − κA iA




(5.36)

On the other hand, the fair price under exchange return strategy is given as:

pB = p

eb∗



∗

∗∗

∗

∗∗



∗

∗∗

∗

∗∗

g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB ) + xA − xA − g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) + xB − xB

=




(5.37)

In the following theorem, we give the closed-form fair prices for firms making technology investments according to MEB with re-optimization after information sharing
under both pricing strategies:
Theorem 5.3 When both firms invest according to their MEBs and re-optimize the
∗

technology investment levels after acquiring information, the fair prices peb and per

∗

are given as follows.

p

eb∗

=

1 + ln

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

P

t∈T

2α
PB P

fat las βB αB




fat las βB αB 1 + γA φ(iA )
1

−
+
2κA iA
2αB 1 + γA φ(iA )

P
P P
1 + ln
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βA αA
−
2α

P
P AP
1 + ln
1
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βA αA 1 + γB φ(iB )

+
−
2κB iB
2αA 1 + γB φ(iB )
1 + ln

P

a∈A

s∈S

t∈T
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(5.38)

p

er∗

=

1 + ln

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

P

α
PB

t∈T

fat las βB αB




fat las βB αB 1 + γA φ(iA )

−
αB 1 + γA φ(iA )

P
P P
1 + ln
f
l
β
α
at
as
A
A
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T
−
αA

P
P P
1 + ln
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βA αA 1 + γB φ(iB )

+
αA 1 + γB φ(iB )
1 + ln

5.1.3

P

a∈A

s∈S

P

t∈T

(5.39)

Case III: Information Sharing Among Multiple Firms

In the third case, we discuss the pricing strategies of information sharing in a
multiple-firm alliance. As introduced in Chapter 4, a centralized coordinator is assumed to be responsible for collecting and distributing the shared information, and
in this case, re-distributing payments among the firms. To start, we give a simpler
example with three firms – Firm A , Firm B and Firm C . The prices paid by the
three firms are denoted as pA , pB and pC . A positive value would imply the firm
pays an amount to the coordinator and a negative values means the firm receives
money from the central coordinator. Considering that the firms use same technology
investment levels throughout the information sharing processes, the cost difference
before and after information sharing for the three firms can be expressed as follows:
Firm A : g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − κA iA + pA

(5.40)

Firm B : g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − κB iB + pB

(5.41)

Firm C : g(xC , 0) − g(xC , iA , iB ) − κC iC + pC

(5.42)

Function g(xA , iB , iC ) represents the information security related losses for Firm A
with technology investment level xA , acquired shared information level iB from Firm
B and iC from Firm C . Similar notation is applied for Firm B and Firm C . After
acquiring shared information from Firm B and Firm C , Firm A’s losses due to
information attacks are reduced to:
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g(xA , iB , iC ) =

XXX


fat las 1 − βA + βA e−αA

 

1+γB φ(iB )+γC φ(iC ) xA

(5.43)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

Where Firm B and Firm C’s information sharing effects are both included as “virtual

−αA 1+γB φ(iB )+γC φ(iC )
investments” in the exponent e
. We can calculate the fair prices
based on this return structure under the equal benefit strategy and the exchange
return strategy as follows.

5.1.3.1

Pricing with Fixed Technology Investment Level

In this three-firm information sharing alliance, the equal benefit strategy based
will ensure the overall payoffs for the three firms are all
and peb
, peb
fair prices peb
C
B
A
equal to each other:

g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − κA iA + pA
= g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − κB iB + pB
= g(xC , 0) − g(xC , iA , iB ) − κC iC + pC
1
g(xA , 0) + g(xB , 0) + g(xC , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − g(xC , iA , iB )
3

− κA iA − κB iB − κC iC
(5.44)
=

Based on this, the fair prices peb
, peb
and peb
can be calculated as the following
A
B
C
expressions:
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2
3
1
−
3
2
peb
=
B
3
1
−
3
2
peb
=
C
3
1
−
3
peb
=
A

g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − κA iA



g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − κB iB + g(xC , 0) − g(xC , iA , iB ) − κC iC
g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − κB iB

(5.45)



(5.46)



(5.47)



g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − κA iA + g(xC , 0) − g(xC , iA , iB ) − κC iC
g(xC , 0) − g(xC , iA , iB ) − κC iC





g(xA , 0) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − κA iA + g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − κB iB

The return of information sharing contributed by a firm can be seen as the total cost
savings of all the other firms due to the decision making firm’s shared information.
Taking Firm A as an example and holding everything else unchanged, the overall
payoffs for Firm B and Firm C are added up as g(xB , iC )+g(xC , iB ). After accounting
for Firm A’s shared information, the summation of the payoffs for Firm B and Firm
C becomes g(xB , iA , iC ) + g(xC , iA , iB ), and the returns due to information shared by
Firm A are the difference of the above two terms:

g(xB , iC ) + g(xC , iB ) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − g(xC , iA , iB )

Hence, the exchange return based fair price for Firm A is given as the following:

per
= g(xB , iC ) + g(xC , iB ) − g(xB , iA , iC ) − g(xC , iA , iB )
A
− g(xA , 0) + g(xA , iB , iC ) + κA iA

(5.48)

Similarly, the exchange return based fair price for Firm B and Firm C can be expressed as:
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per
= g(xA , iC ) + g(xC , iA ) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − g(xC , iA , iB )
B
− g(xB , 0) + g(xB , iA , iC ) + κB iB

(5.49)

per
= g(xA , iB ) + g(xB , iA ) − g(xA , iB , iC ) − g(xB , iA , iC )
C
− g(xC , 0) + g(xC , iA , iB ) + κC iC

(5.50)

Based on the structures from (5.45)-(5.47) and (5.48)-(5.50), we can summarize the
fair price under equal benefit strategy and exchange return strategy in a generalized
multiple firms setting. For an information sharing alliance Γ with |Γ| as the number
of firms, the fair prices for any firm R ∈ Γ are as follows:


P

|Γ| − 1 X X X
−αR (xR + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI )xR )
−αR xR
pR =
fat las βR e
− βR e
|Γ|
a∈A s∈S t∈T

X XXX
P

1
−αK (xK + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI )xK )
−αK xK
fat las βK e
−
− βK e
|Γ| K∈Γ,K6=R a∈A s∈S t∈T
eb

(5.51)
=
per
R

X
K∈Γ,K6=R

XXX

fat las βK e−αK (xK +

P

I∈Γ,I6=K,R

γI φ(iI )xK )

a∈A s∈S t∈T
−αK (xK +

− βK e
−

XXX

−αR xR

fat las βR e

P

I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI )xK )







P

−αR (xR + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI )xR )

− βR e

(5.52)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

5.1.3.2

Pricing under Re-optimized Technology Investment Levels

Following the Section 5.1.1.2 and 5.1.2.2, in this subsection we study the fair prices
when firms invest according to MEB and re-optimize technology investments in the
multi-firm information sharing alliance.
We use x∗R and x∗∗
to denote the technology investment level according to MEB
R
before and after information sharing by Firm R ∈ Γ. The fair prices can then be
adapted from (5.56) as:
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eb∗

pR



P

|Γ| − 1 X X X
−αR x∗
−αR (x∗∗ + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI )x∗∗ )
∗
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R − β e
R
R
=
fat las βR e
+ xR − xR
R
|Γ|
a∈A s∈S t∈T

X XXX
P

1
−αK x∗
−αK (x∗∗ + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI )x∗∗ )
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K − β e
K
K
fat las βK e
−
+ xK − xK
K
|Γ| K∈Γ,K6=R a∈A s∈S t∈T

∗

per
=
R

XXX

fat las βR e−αR xR

(5.53)

P

−αR (xR + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI )xR )
∗
∗∗
− βR e
+ xR − xR

a∈A s∈S t∈T

−

X
K∈Γ,K6=R

XXX

P

I∈Γ,I6=K,R

γI φ(iI )xK )

a∈A s∈S t∈T

−αK (xK +

− βK e

fat las βK e−αK (xK +

P

I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI )xK )



∗

∗∗



+ xK − xK

(5.54)

By solving for the optimal technology investment levels x∗R and x∗∗
, we can further
R
derive the closed-form fair price for a Firm R in a set of information sharing alliance
Γ by the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4 In an information sharing alliance composed of a set Γ of firms, firm
R’s prices to pay under equal benefit and exchange return strategies are as follows:

eb∗

pR

P
P P

|Γ| − 1 1 + ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βR αR )
=
|Γ|
αR

P
P
P P
1 + ln
I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ))
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βR αR (1 +
P
−
αR (1 + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ))
P
P P
X  1 + ln(
1
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βK αK )
−
|Γ| K∈Γ,K6=R
αK

P
P P
P
1 + ln
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βK αK (1 +
I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI ))
P
−
αK (1 + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI ))
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(5.55)

er∗



pR =

1 + ln(

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

P

αR
P

t∈T

fat las βR αR )


P
fat las βR αR (1 + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ))
P
−
αR (1 + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ))
P
P P
P
X  1 + ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βK αK (1 + I∈Γ,I6=K,I6=R γI φ(iI )))
P
−
α
(1
+
K
I∈Γ,I6=K,R γI φ(iI ))
K∈Γ,K6=R
P
P P
P

1 + ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βK αK (1 + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI )))
P
−
(5.56)
αK (1 + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI ))
1 + ln

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

t∈T

The two fair prices under the equal benefit strategy and the exchange return
strategy with the firms re-optimizing technology investment levels after information
sharing is compared through an numerical example in the next subsection.

5.1.4

Numerical Analysis

As introduced earlier in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, the equal benefit strategy
and exchange return strategy each feature a different way to address “fairness” of
pricing in information sharing. The equal benefit strategy addresses fairness in terms
of the absolute value in payoffs, while the exchange return strategy re-allocates the
payoffs according to the share of “contribution” made by a firm. In this section, we
study the implications of these two pricing strategies through a practical data-based
numerical example. As part of the analysis, we compare the fair prices and overall
payoffs under the two strategies in a multiple firm information sharing setting. Policy
insights are drawn from the analysis, which provides guidelines for firms intending to
practice information sharing through a similar multi-firm setting.
In this numerical example, we consider an information sharing alliance consisting
of 10 firms. To model the real information sharing alliance in an industry environment, we utilize the data obtained from the surveys we described in Chapter 3 when
creating the firms’ profiles. For analysis purposes, we assume that the 10 firms all
have similar abilities to pay for information security technologies as indicated by the
parameter α, and that the technologies all have similar efficacy as indicated by pa108

Table 5.1: Parameter set ups for the firm profiles
PTL
Uniform(20,872,808,

54,669,745)

βR
0.59505

αR
1.29E-06

γR
0.053

κR
0.27PTL

rameter β. The scaling factor γ is considered as being proportional to the optimal
technology investment levels without information sharing. All these above parameters are standardized as being equal to the mean values obtained from the survey
results. Moreover, to examine the differences in behaviors between larger sized firms
and smaller sized firms, we allow the potential total losses to vary uniformly within
40% of the mean average PTL value from the survey results. The marginal cost of
information sharing is set to be 0.27% of PTL as discussed earlier in Chapter 4. A
full list of the 10 firm profiles are listed in Table 5.1.
We first compare the fair prices with the equal benefits strategy and the exchange
return strategy in a decision making firm with varying information sharing levels.
Specifically, we observe such trends in a typical smaller firm S (with PTL greater
than 20% of all firms) and in a typical larger firm L (with PTL greater than 80%
of all firms). As shown in Figure 5.1a, firm S would always pay higher prices under
the exchange return strategy than the equal benefit strategy, with the prices getting
closest to each other at 70% information sharing level. For the larger firm L, as shown
in Figure 5.1b,the price based on the exchange return strategy is higher than the equal
benefit-based price when the firm’s information sharing level is below 65% or above
95%, and lower the than equal benefit-based price when the firm’s sharing level is
between the two threshold values. It is implied that smaller firms or firms with lower
information sharing levels tend to pay less under the equal benefit strategy than the
exchange return strategy. Larger firms with near-optimal information sharing levels
can potentially pay less under the exchange return strategy.
The payoffs for a smaller firm S and larger firm L are shown in Figure 5.2, under
the equal benefit and the exchange return strategies. For the smaller firm S, as
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(a) Fair price for a typical small firm S.

(b) Fair price for a typical large firm L.

Price of information sharing (in U.S. Dollars)
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Figure 5.1: Fair price under equal benefit and exchange return strategies.
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shown in Figure 5.2a, the payoffs under the exchange strategy is always exceeded by
the payoff under the equal benefit strategy. For the larger firm L, exchange return
strategy can yield higher payoff when its information sharing level lies between the
65% – 95% range. From an overall payoff perspective, smaller firms or firms with
lower information sharing levels are favored under the equal benefit strategy, while
larger firms investing near optimal information sharing levels are better off under the
exchange return strategy.
It is worth noting that, as illustrated in Figure 5.2a and Figure 5.2b, the equal
benefit strategy would allow firms receive positive payoffs even when they do not share
any information. While such phenomenon will not occur under a two-firm mutual
information sharing setting, it shows that free-riding is possible under equal benefit
strategy in multiple firm information sharing settings. To this end, it is recommended
that the exchange return strategy is applied for multiple firm information sharing
alliances to ensure fairness.
Finally, we consider an overview of the price differences and payoff differences
under the two pricing strategies for all the firms in the alliance. Figure 5.3 shows the
differences in prices and payoffs under the equal benefit and exchange return strategies
for all 10 firms in the information sharing alliance. According to Figure 5.3, some firms
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Figure 5.2: Overall payoffs under equal benefit and exchange return strategies.
(a) Overall payoffs for a typical small firm S. (b) Overall payoffs for a typical large firm L.
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Figure 5.3: Differences in prices and overall payoffs under two pricing strategies for
all 10 firms.
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would resemble firm S, who constantly favor the equal benefit strategy, as the price is
always lower than that under the exchange return strategy. The other firms resemble
firm L, who would favor the exchange return strategy by sharing according to the
optimal levels. It is also observed that the differences in prices and payoffs under the
two strategies are reduced to minimum when firms mutually agree to share around
their own optimal information sharing levels. Therefore, if equal benefit strategy is to
be selected due to small firms’ advocacy, pushing firms to share according to optimal
information sharing levels would preserve fairness to the maximum extent.
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5.2

Conclusion

While information sharing can potentially help firms strengthen their information
security defense, the asymmetry in information sharing often makes it difficult for the
firms to collaborate. In this chapter, we study the pricing strategies of asymmetric
information sharing, which addresses the benefit allocation among the participating
firms and provides incentives for sharing information. We discuss the asymmetric
information sharing in three distinct settings that covers most asymmetric information
sharing scenarios in reality: two firms one-way information sharing, two firms mutual
information sharing and multiple firms mutual information sharing. Through the two
firm one-way information sharing case, we give the condition that makes asymmetric
information sharing cost-effective for the firms. Next, while discussing the two firm
mutual information sharing case, we proposed two different pricing strategies: the
equal benefit strategy and the exchange return strategy. Under each strategy, we
give the fair price of information sharing for the applied cases. We also solved the
close-form expression of fair prices for firms that adjust technology investment MEB
levels according to the sharing of information.
We demonstrate the differences in equal benefits strategy and exchange return
strategy through an numerical example based on real-world data for policy insights.
We find that free-riding can possibly happen in a multiple firm information sharing
alliance under the equal benefit strategy, with smaller sizes or with low information
sharing levels most likely to exploit this strategy. Hence, we recommend that the
exchange return strategy to be applied in such setting to ensure fairness. In case
that equal benefit strategy to be applied due to other reasons, we demonstrate that
fairness is best preserved if all members of the alliance share according to optimal
information sharing level that maximizes the return on information sharing.
As one of the few studies on asymmetric information sharing using operations
management approach, the findings of this chapter can provide policy insights for
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the firms that are intended to participate in information sharing. For those existing
industry-based information sharing alliances, the analytical models from this chapter
can assist the centralized coordinators to come up with their specialized pricing strategy. As future work, this problem could also be combined with a game-theoretical
model by considering firm’s intension, motivation and potential competition with each
other. The performance of these pricing strategies under dynamic environments is
also an interesting topic for future studies.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this dissertation, we study the management of information system security
investment using operations management approaches. Three relevant problems are
studied throughout the thesis. In the first study, we address the key decisions involved
in information security technology investments. In the second study, we discuss information sharing in information system security. In the third study, we investigate in
the pricing strategies under asymmetric information sharing for information system
security.
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, we provide general introduction and literature review
regarding the background for the problems studied in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we
study the first problem of information system security technology investment problem.
To this end, we derive a simple functional relationship between the potential total
losses of a firm and the optimal amount that the firm should invest in information
systems security. Related to this, we find that firms in finance, energy, and technology
sectors should invest twice more in trying to detect information security breaches,
than in trying to prevent them. In other industries, information security investments
should be split evenly between preventive and detective measures. Moreover, the
overall information security budgets for certain types of firms in the former set of
industries should be on average 4% higher than other industries, even when the
potential total losses under a security breach are the same. As some additional
conclusions, we find that the value of these optimal policies is higher for small to
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medium sized firms, while a gradual investment strategy over a budget period is
better than early utilization of the budget at the beginning of this period.
In Chapter 4, we study the second problem of information sharing in information
system security. We build up a stochastic framework to capture the inter-relationship
between information sharing and technology investments, where the two act as strategic counterparts of information system security. We find that, for firms with pre-fixed
technology investment levels, the optimal information sharing level decreases as the
marginal cost of information sharing becomes higher, and there exists a threshold
value such that firms are better off by not sharing information if the marginal cost
of information sharing exceeds this threshold value. For the optimal information
sharing level, we find that firms with larger security budgets should share 15% more
information, when compared to optimal sharing levels of small to medium sized firms.
In Chapter 5, we discuss the third problem of asymmetric information sharing
in information system security. We evaluate two pricing strategies for asymmetrical
information sharing under three distinct settings. We give analytical expressions of
the fair price values under the different pricing strategies and come up with policy
insights through both analytical and numerical analysis. For two firm information
sharing setting, we find that firms could benefit from information sharing only when
marginal information sharing cost is below certain threshold. For multiple firms
information sharing setting, we recommend that the exchange return strategy to
be applied to ensure fairness, whereas the equal benefit strategy can be potentially
exploited by small size and low-level information sharing firms.
We believe that firms can benefit from our work either through direct implementation for specific guidance, or through indirect use of several policy results obtained.
An important characteristic of our studies is that we build our models by using realworld data through survey to information system security practitioners. As one of the
few studies on information system security investment management through opera-
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tions management approaches, our work also set the first step for futures studies on
related topics that can be explored by researchers in the field of management science.
As potential future research for the information system security technology investment, we note that parameter calibration and model validation is critical for any
future implementation of the presented framework. Therefore, future work may involve assessment of accuracy of quantification of relevant measures as well as expert
opinions used in the model. The observed performance of information system security
through applying managerial insights on technology investment would also constitute
an important extension to our study in terms of its practical significance.
For future research regarding information sharing in information system security,
it is of value to analyze firm’s behavior and motivations by considering competition
and strategic decisions. Current modeling framework in this thesis considers the firms
are all willing to cooperate and exactly follows the strategies proposed by the decision
makers. Hence, if such assumptions were to be relaxed and firms are allowed to act
according to their own interest, their individual decisions are likely to vary from what
are found in this work.
Lastly, for the problem of asymmetric information sharing in information system
security, potential extension of this work can focus on the uncertainty within the
decision-making process. Specifically, in addition to the uncertainty in maximum effectiveness of technology countermeasures, we can future extend the stochastic setting
to cover the dynamics in information sharing efficacy. It would also be interesting
to analyze the pricing strategies of asymmetric information sharing behave under
different risk measures.
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APPENDIX
PROOFS OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS

Proof of Lemma 3.1
The proof is by showing that the partial derivatives of eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) with regard to
ρoo0 , eoa (xo ) and eo0 a (xo0 ) are nonnegative in the range ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }]. To
o a

this end, we calculate the partial derivatives as follows:
∂eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
= eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 ) − 2ρoo0 eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )
∂ρoo0
= eoa (xo )(1 − ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 )) + eo0 a (xo0 )(1 − ρoo0 eoa (xo ))

Without loss of generality we assume that βoa ≥ βo0 a . Hence, per the lemma statement, we have that ρoo0 ≤ min{ β1oa , β 10 } =
o a

1
.
βoa

It follows that:

∂eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
eo0 a (xo0 )
eoa (xo )
> eoa (xo )(1 −
) + eo0 a (xo0 )(1 −
)
∂ρoo0
βoa
βoa
βo0 a
> eoa (xo )(1 −
)>0
βoa
where by definition eo0 a (xo0 ) ≤ βo0 a .
The second and third cases can be shown using a similar setup. We show the
derivation for the case of eoa (xo0 ) below:
∂eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
= ρoo0 − ρ2oo0 eo0 a (xo0 ) = ρoo0 (1 − ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 ))
∂eoa (xo0 )
eo0 a (xo0 )
βo 0 a
> ρoo0 (1 −
) = ρoo0 (1 −
)>0
βoa
βoa
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Similarly, we can easily show that

∂eoo0 a (xo ,xo0 )
∂eoa (xo )

≥ 0. Hence, given the nonnegativity of

the partial derivatives in the calculations above, the lemma holds. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1
First, we show that a real-valued ρoo0 always exists for any eoa (xo ), eo0 a (xo0 ),
eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) ∈ [0, 1]. To this end, we express equation eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = ρoo0 eoa (xo ) +
ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 ) − ρ2oo0 eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 ) as a quadratic equation of ρoo0 as follows:

−eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )ρ2oo0 + [eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 )]ρoo0 − eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = 0

(A.1)

Considering the roots of this equation, we get:

ρ+
oo0

[eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 )] +
=
2eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )

√

∆

ρ−
oo0

[eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 )] −
=
2eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )

√

∆
(A.2)

where the discriminant ∆ is defined as:

∆ = [eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 )]2 − 4eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
= [eoa (xo )]2 + [eo0 a (x0o )]2 + 2eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 ) − 4eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
> e2oa + e2o0 a + 2eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 ) − 4eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )
= [eoa (xo ) − eo0 a (xo0 )]2 > 0

(A.3)

−
which follows from the fact that eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the roots ρ+
oo0 and ρoo0
−
exist. Moreover, because eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) ∈ [0, 1], it is obvious that both ρ+
oo0 and ρoo0 are
p
√
positive since eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 ) = [eoa (xo ) + eo0 a (xo0 )]2 > ∆ always holds.

We now show that ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }], when the effectiveness measures are in
o a

the range [0, 1]. This mainly follows from Lemma 1. Given that the joint effectiveness
is increasing in the individual effectiveness functions eoa (xo ) and eo0 a (x0o ), the lowest
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and highest values for eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ), which are respectively 0 and 1, would be realized
when the individual effectiveness functions are at their lowest and highest levels.
Hence, for eoa (xo ) = eo0 a (x0o ) = eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = 0, we note that ρoo0 = 0 satisfies
relationship

eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = ρoo0 eoa (xo ) + ρoo0 eo0 a (xo0 ) − ρ2oo0 eoa (xo )eo0 a (xo0 )
For the highest values of eoa (xo ) = βoa , eo0 a (x0o ) = βo0 a , and eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) = 1, without
−
loss of generality we can consider ρ−
oo0 only. For the given values, we have ρoo0 =
√
βoa +βo0 a − ∆
,
2βoa βo0 a

ρ−
oo0

where ∆ = (βoa + βo0 a )2 − 4βoa βo0 a = (βoa − βo0 a )2 . It follows that:

p
βoa + βo0 a − (βoa − βo0 a )2
βoa + βo0 a − |βoa − βo0 a |
2 min{βoa , βo0 a }
=
=
=
2βoa βo0 a
2βoa βo0 a
2βoa βo0 a
1
1
1
=
= min{
,
}
(A.4)
max{βoa , βo0 a }
βoa βo0 a

Given that the joint effectiveness function eoo0 a (xo , xo0 ) is increasing in ρoo0 as
shown in Lemma 1, there always exists ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β1oa , β 10 }] such that eoo0 a (xo , xo0 )
o a

can be defined for all values of xo and xo0 . 
Proof of Proposition 3.2
kω
kω
The proof is by showing that the second derivative of function Ioo
0 at (xo ) is nonkω
negative. Given the definition of ekω
oat (xo ) in relationship

eoa (xo ) = βoa − e−(αo xo −ln βoa ) = βoa − βoa e−αo xo

we have that:
kω

kω
kω
kω
kω −αo xo
)
Ioo
0 at (xo ) = ln(1 − ρoo0 βoat + ρoo0 βoat e

It follows that:
kω

kω
kω 2 −αo xo
kω
∂ 2 Ioo
ρoo0 βoat
αo e
(1 − ρoo0 βoat
)
0 at
=
kω
2
kω
kω
−α
x
2
o
kω
o ))
(1 − ρoo0 (βoat − βoat e
∂xo
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1
1
kω
By Proposition 1, we have ρoo0 ∈ [0, min{ β kω
, β kω
}]. Hence, 1 − ρoo0 βoat
> 0.
oat

o0 at

Moreover, all other components in the numerator are nonnegative by definition. Given
that the denominator consists of a squared term, it is also nonnegative, implying that
kω
∂ 2 Ioo
0 at
2
∂xkω
o

kω
kω
kω
> 0, and that the function Ioo
0 at (xo ) is convex in xo . 

Proof of Proposition 3.3
The proof follows from the definition of the objective function
#

"
X

p

ω

XXXX

fat last Yatkω

+

xkω
o

k∈K o∈O

k∈K s∈S a∈A t∈T

ω∈Ω

XX

which we can rewrite as:
"
X
ω∈Ω

pω

!
XXX

fat

k∈K a∈A t∈T

X

last Yatkω +

s∈S

#
XX

xkω
o

k∈K o∈O

Based on this representation, coefficients in the objective function depend only on
the sum of the losses in the set of assets, as opposed to individual asset losses. Given
that the parameters last are not part of the constraint structure, the optimal resource
allocation, and hence the optimal level of cybersecurity budget is independent of the
mix of assets that the firm holds. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Let Z(x) denote the objective function representing the total costs, while an aggregated notation without any subscripts is used to denote the other parameters and
variables in the model. Based on this, the objective can be expressed as:
Z(x) = f l(1 − β + βe−αx ) + x

Taking the first order derivative of Z(x) with respect to x:
∂Z(x)
= f lβe−αx (−α) + 1
∂x
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The second order derivative of the above function shows convexity as:
∂ 2 Z(x)
= f 2 l2 β 2 α2 e−αx + 1 > 0
∂x2
By setting the first order derivative equal to 0, the optimal investment level can be
identified as x∗ =

1
α

ln (αβf l). The ratio of the optimal investment level x∗ to the

potential total loss f l is then given as
can be rewritten as βf (z) where f (z) =

ln(αβf l)
.
αf l
ln z
.
z

Denoting αβf l by z, the above ratio

The function f (z) has a single maximum

at f 0 (z) = 0, when z = e. Therefore, we have that
β ln (αβf l)
β
x∗
=
6
fl
αf l
e

Proof of Lemma 4.1
To begin, the second order derivative of objective (4.2) as a function of i can be
written as:
XXX

−α(x+

fat las αβγh2 xe−h(i−z) e

γx
)
1+e−h(i−z)

−e−2h(i−z) + αγxe−h(i−z) + 1



a∈A s∈S t∈T

after collecting the common term. Because the parameters fas , las , α, β, γ, h, x are all
γx
P
P P
−α(x+
)
1+e−h(i−z)
is positive
positive, the term a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las αβγh2 xe−h(i−z) e
as well.
Denoting y = e−h(i−z) , the second term −e−2h(i−z) + αγxe−h(i−z) + 1 from the
second order derivative above can be treated as a quadratic function of e−h(i−z) as
G(y) = −y 2 +αγxy +1. Note that y = e−h(i−z) is a monotonically decreasing function
when i ∈ [0, 1], with lower bound y|i=1 = e−h(1−z) being a value that is very close to
0, and upper bound y|i=0 = ehz is an arbitrarily large value according to the value
setting of parameter h and z.
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By setting the quadratic function equal to zero and solve for the positive root of
G(y) = −y 2 + αγxy + 1 = 0, it can be shown easily that function G(y) ≥ 0 when
q
q
2 2 2
α2 γ 2 x2
y ∈ [e−h(1−z) , α γ4 x + 1 + αγx
]
and
G(y)
<
0
when
y
∈
(
+ 1 + αγx
, ehz ].
2
4
2
Equivalently, the above condition can be written regarding variable i as

ln
−e

−2h(i−z)

−h(i−z)

+ αγxe

−e

−h(i−z)

+ αγxe

α 2 γ 2 x2
4

i ∈ [0, z −

+ 1 < 0,

+ 1 ≥ 0,

+1+

αγx
2

q

α 2 γ 2 x2
4

i ∈ [z −

+1+


]

h

ln
−2h(i−z)

q

αγx
2


, 1]

h

Therefore,
secondorder derivative of the objective
function (4.2)
is positive on
q

q
ln

[z −

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

ln

, 1] and negative on [0, z −

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

]. Therefore, the

conclusion of Lemma 4.1 follows. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1
We start the proof of Theorem 4.1 by showing monotonicity of the objective (4.2)
as a function of i. The first order derivative of objective (4.2) as a function of i is
denoted as

F 0 (i) = −

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

−α(x+

P

t∈T

fat las αβγhxe−h(i−z) e

γx
)
1+e−h(i−z)

2

(1 + e−h(i−z) )

+κ

Following the conclusion of Lemma
4.1, the first
order derivative of objective F 0 (i) as

q
ln

is decreasing
on i ∈ [0, z −


ln

i ∈ [z −
ln

i0 = z −

q

α2 γ 2 x2
+1+ αγx
4
2

q

h
α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

], and increasing on

, 1], with a minimum value reached at


h

.

Next, we note that h is chosen to be a large enough number such that when i = 0,
ehz ≈ 0, and when i = 1,

1
1+e−h(1−z)

≈ 0. It can be shown by applying L’Hospital’s

rule that F 0 (0) ≈ κ > 0 as well as F 0 (1) ≈ κ > 0. Hence, the first order condition
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F 0 (i) = 0 has two roots i∗(1) and i∗(2) if and only if the minimum value F 0 (i0 ) < 0, and
their values satisfies the inequality i∗(1) < i0 < i∗(2) . The signs of F 0 (i) can be further
determined as: F 0 (i) ≥ 0, i ∈ [0, i∗(1) ] ∪ [i∗(2) , 1] and F 0 (i) < 0, i ∈ [i∗(1) , i∗(2) ]
Based on the monotonicity of the first order derivative F 0 (i), and the conclusion
in Lemma 4.1 , the objective function (4.2) then has two local maxima at i = i∗(1) and
i = 1, and two local minima at i = i∗(2) and i = 0. Therefore, the minimum occurs
at i = 0 if the objective function F (i) has F (0) > F (i∗(2) ). Hence the conclusion of
Theorem 1 follows. 
Proof of Corollary 4.1
From the proof of Theorem
value of the first order derivative
q 4.1, the minimum

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

ln

0

is F (i0 ) where i0 = z −

h

. Hence, the first order derivative as a

function of i is positive on i ∈ [0, 1] if F 0 (i0 ) > 0, and the objective function would be
increasing on i ∈ [0, 1]. The condition of F 0 (i0 ) > 0 can be written in explicit form as

r
ln

−

P
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P

s∈S

P

t∈T

αγx
α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ 2
4
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h
r
ln



−h(z−
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γx
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!

r
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1+e

e

α2 γ 2 x 2
αγx
+1+ 2
4

!
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α2 γ 2 x 2
αγx
+1+ 2
4
h

)

!
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2
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h

and simplified to


P

a∈A

P

s∈S

κ≥

q

α 2 γ 2 x2
4

αγx
2

+1+
fat las αγxh

q
2 2 2
1 + α γ4 x + 1 +

as in Corollary 4.1. 
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αγx
2

γx
−αx+ r
α2 γ 2 x 2
αγx
+1+ 2
1+
4

e
2




Proof of Proposition 4.1
From the proof of Theorem 4.1, the first order derivative of objective function
0

F (i) = −
ln

q

P

a∈A

P

s∈S

P

t∈T

fat las αβγhxe−h(i−z) e

−α(x+

2

(1+e−h(i−z) )

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

γx
)
1+e−h(i−z)

+ κ is increasing on i ∈ [z −



, 1]. Denote
functionT (i) = F 0 (i) − κ, then function T (i) is also

q

ln

increasing on i ∈ [z −

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

, 1].

h

P

Next, conditioned on κ ≤
ln

∗

q

there exist i > z −





−α
x+

a∈A

P

q

α2 γ 2 x2
αγx
f
l
αγxh
+1+
e
at
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s∈S
4
2
 q
2
2 2 2
1+ α γ4 x +1+ αγx
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α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h

r
1+


γx


α 2 γ 2 x2
αγx
+1+
4
2

such that F 0 (i∗ ) = 0 and T (i∗ ) = −κ. When

κ increase to a greater value
q κl but still satisfies the condition above, there also exist a value of

i∗l

α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

ln

>z−
ln

q

is increasing on i ∈ [z −

such that T (i∗l ) = −κl . As function T (i)

h
α2 γ 2 x 2
+1+ αγx
4
2

h



, 1], it can be concluded by the property

of inverse function that i∗l < i∗ since T (i∗l ) < T (i∗ ). Therefore, the conclusion of
Proposition 4.1 holds. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof of Theorem 5.1 can be seen as a variation of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Specifically, by replacing notation β, x, and α with βB , xB , and αB ; replacing γ, i,
and κ with γA , iA , and κA , the result of Theorem 5.1 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5.1
To proof the item (1) in Proposition 5.1, we first show the convexity of the fair
price under equal benefit strategy as a function of technology investment level xB . In
expanded form, the fair price as a function of xB can be written as:
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1 XXX
p (xB ) =g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) =
fat las βB e−αB xB
2 a∈A s∈S t∈T

1
−αB (xB +γA φ(iA )xB )
− βB e
− κA iA (A.5)
2
eb

The first order derivative of xB is given as:
∂peb (xB )
1 XXX
=
fat las βB αB
∂xB
2 a∈A s∈S t∈T




1+γA φ(iA )xB e−αB



1+γA φ(iA )xB xB

−αB xB



−e

(A.6)

The second order derivative of xB is given as:
2 eb

1
∂ p (xB )
=
2
∂xB
4

!2
XXX

fat las βB αB

−αB xB

e



 −α x
1− 1+γA φ(iA )xB e B B (A.7)

a∈A s∈S t∈T

It can be shown by testing the first order derivative and second order derivative

h
ln(1+γ φ(i ))
as in (A.6) and (A.7) that peb (xB ) is monotonically increasing on 0, α γ Aφ(i A)
B A
A


ln(1+γA φ(iA ))
concavely, and monotonically decreasing on
, ∞ convexly. Therefore,
α γ φ(i )
B A

A

item (1) of Proposition 5.1 follows.
The proof of item (2) in Proposition 5.1 follows the same approach as in the proof
of 4.1. To proof item (2) in Proposition 5.1, we first consider the fair price as a
function of iA :

1 XXX
fat las βB e−αB xB
p (iA ) =g(xB , 0) − g(xB , iA ) =
2 a∈A s∈S t∈T

1
−αB (xB +γA φ(iA )xB )
− βB e
− κA iA (A.8)
2
eb

Following the proof of Theorem 4.1, it can be shown that function (A.8) has two local
minima at iA = i∗A

(0)

iA = i∗A

(0)

and iA = 0 and two local maxima at iA = i∗A

and iA = i∗A

are the two solutions of
(1)
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∂peb (iA )
∂iA

(1)

and iA = 1, where

= 0. Moreover, the condition

r
ln

i∗A

α2 γ 2 x 2
B B B
4

≥z−

+1+

α

γ x
B A B
2

h

(0)

!

has ensured that peb (iA ) ≥ peb (0). Therefore, the

conclusion of item (2) in Proposition 5.1 follows. 
Proof of Theorem 5.2
The close-form expression of the MEB for Firm B before and after information
sharing can be solved following similar manner as discussed in the proof of Proposition
3.4. By solving for the first order condition of Firm B’s total cost before and after
information sharing:

Bef ore :

XXX
∂g(xB , 0)
+1=−
fat las βB αB e−αB xB + 1 = 0
∂xB
a∈A s∈S t∈T

∂g(xB , iA )
+1
∂xB
XXX

fat las βB 1 + γA φ(iA ) αB e−αB
=−

Af ter :



1+γA φ(iA ) xB

+1=0

a∈A s∈S t∈T

We can then obtain the close-form expression of x∗B and x∗∗
as:
B
P
P P
ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βB αB )
xB =
αB

P
P P
ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βB 1 + γA φ(iA ) αB )
∗∗

xB =
1 + γA φ(iA ) αB
∗

(A.9)
(A.10)

Plugging in (A.9) and (A.10) into the fair price under equal benefit strategy as given
by (5.16), the results of Theorem 5.2 follows. 
Proof of Corollary 5.1
We first note in this proof that, under equal benefit strategy, the payoff for Firm A
and Firm B are equal. When Firm B always invest according to the pre-information
sharing MEB, the payoffs for each firm is:

g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗B , iA ) − p
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Whereas when Firm B adjust its technology investment according to new MEB after
information sharing, the payoffs for each firm is:

g(x∗B , 0) − g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
−p
B
B

The increase in overall payoffs by re-optimization can be expressed as:

g(x∗B , iA ) − g(x∗∗
, iA ) + x∗B − x∗∗
B
B

(A.11)

values as given in (A.9) and (A.10), we have:
Plugging in the x∗B and x∗∗
B

∗

g(xB , iA ) =

XXX


fat las (1 − βB ) +

a∈A s∈S t∈T

, iA ) =
g(x∗∗
B

XXX

fat las (1 − βB ) +

a∈A s∈S t∈T

1
αB

1+γA φA (iA )
(A.12)

1
αB (1 + γA φA (iA ))

(A.13)

Combining (A.9)-(A.10), (A.12)-(A.12) with (A.11), the conclusion of Corollary 5.1
follows. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is similar to that of Theorem 5.2. By setting the
first order derivative of Firm A’s total costs before and after sharing information as
functions of xA , respectively, we have:

Bef ore :

XXX
∂g(xA , 0)
+1=−
fat las βA αA e−αA xA + 1 = 0
∂xA
a∈A s∈S t∈T

∂g(xA , iB )
+1
∂xA
XXX

=−
fat las βA 1 + γB φ(iB ) αA e−αA

Af ter :

a∈A s∈S t∈T
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1+γB φ(iB ) xA

+1=0

We can then obtain the close-form expression of x∗A and x∗∗
as:
A
P
P P
ln(
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T fat las βA αA )
x∗A =
αA

P
P P
ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βA 1 + γB φ(iB ) αA )
∗∗

xA =
1 + γB φ(iB ) αA

(A.14)
(A.15)

Plugging in (A.9)-(A.10), (A.16)-(A.17) into the fair price under equal benefit strategy
and exchange return strategies as given by (5.36)-(5.37), the results of Theorem 5.3
follows. 
Proof of Theorem 5.4
The proof of Theorem 5.4 follows the same approaches as in the proofs of Theorem
5.2 and 5.3. We first show the MEBs of technology investment for Firm R before and
after information sharing by solving the first order conditions:

Bef ore : −

XXX

fat las βR αR e−αR xR + 1 = 0

a∈A s∈S t∈T

Af ter : −

XXX

fat las βR 1 +

a∈A s∈S t∈T

X


γI φ(iI ) αR e−αA


P
1+ I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ) xR

+1=0

I∈Γ,I6=R

can be given as:
Where the close-form expression of x∗R and x∗∗
R
∗

xR =
∗∗

xR =

ln(
ln

P

a∈A

P

P

a∈A

s∈S

P

t∈T

α
P RP
s∈S

fat las βR αR )

 
P
fat las βR 1 + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ) αR

P
1 + I∈Γ,I6=R γI φ(iI ) αR
t∈T

(A.16)
(A.17)

The MEBs for other firm Ks can be obtained in a similar fashion as:
P
P P
ln( a∈A s∈S t∈T fat las βK αK )
xK =
αK
 
P
P P
P
ln
f
l
β
1
+
γ
φ(i
)
αK
at
as
K
I
I
a∈A
s∈S
t∈T
I∈Γ,I6
=
K

P
x∗∗
=
K
1 + I∈Γ,I6=K γI φ(iI ) αK
∗
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(A.18)
(A.19)

Plugging in (A.16)-(A.19) into the fair prices under equal benefit and exchange return
strategies as given by (5.55) and (5.56), the results of Theorem 5.4 follows. 
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